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GEORGE J. MITCHELL: MAINE'S
ENVIRONMENTAL SENATOR'
I. INTRODUCTION
The State of Maine is blessed with a history of impressive and
respected politicians. Among others, the list includes James Blaine,
Margaret Chase Smith, and Edmund S. Muskie. The State now
must add the name of George J. Mitchell to these ranks. A native
son of Waterville, Maine, he attended Bowdoin College, Ge-
orgetown University Law Center, and eventually catapulted himself
into one of the most powerful political positions in the United States
government when he was elected as majority leader of the United
States Senate.2 During his tenure as majority leader, he helped to
redefine the position through his strong work ethic, sense of fair-
ness, and orientation toward results in the Senate. This Comment
summarizes some of those results through an environmental lens,
focusing on Mitchell's contributions to federal environmental legis-
lation in the late 1980s. As Mitchell served in the Senate for four-
teen years, six as the majority leader, he sponsored or cosponsored
countless pieces of legislation. Environmental protection, however,
always was a focus of his public service.3 In that vein, this Comment
canvasses Senator Mitchell's influence on the provisions of the
Water Quality Act of 1987,4 the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, 5 and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,6 three major legislative
accomplishments aimed at protecting the environment. This Coin-
1. The Author extends special thanks to Sharon Sudbay, field representative in
Senator Mitchell's office in Portland, Maine. Her help was invaluable and her kind
words an inspiration throughout the writing of this Comment.
2. Senator Mitchell's career experiences are varied: Army Counter Intelligence
Corps, Berlin, Germany, 1954-1956; L.L.B., Georgetown University Law Center,
1960; United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 1960-1962; Executive
Assistant to United States Senator Edmund Muskie, 1962-1965; partner, law firm of
Jensen, Baird, Gardner, Donovan & Henry, 1965-1977; Chairman of the Maine
State Democratic Party, 1966-1968; Assistant District Attorney for Cumberland
County, 1971; Democratic Candidate for Governor, 1974; United States Attorney
for Maine, 1977-1979; United States District Court Judge, 1979-1980; United States
Senator, 1980-1994; Majority Leader 1988-1994. THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 554 (1994).
3. Senator Mitchell recently authored a book on environmental protection and
the greenhouse effect. See SENATOR GEORGE J. MITCHELL, WORLD ON FIRE: SAV-
ING AN ENDANGERED EARTH (1991).
4. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1988) (amending the Federal Water Pollution Prevention Control Act,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1987)).
5. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7671 (1983 & Supp. 1994)).
6. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (Supp. 1994)).
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ment analyzes those provisions of each Act for which Senator
Mitchell fought most ardently and discusses the different tactics and
strategies he employed to secure passage of each of these important
bills. Finally, this Comment is a tribute to a Maine native who dedi-
cated his life to public service. This Author recognizes that no one
Senator could be solely responsible for any of these three pieces of
environmental legislation. Nonetheless, only a few Senators held
the key to passage of each of these acts. George J. Mitchell was one
of the those Senators.
Senator Mitchell's contributions to environmental law can be un-
derstood only by viewing his Senate career in context. First, Mitch-
ell served as a Federal District Court Judge for the District of
Maine.7 Although his tenure as a federal judge did not last a full
year, Mitchell retained the aura of a judge throughout his Senate
career.8 Indeed, when he announced his retirement from the
United States Senate, rumors persisted about Senator Mitchell's
possible appointment to the United States Supreme Court.9
Second, George J. Mitchell's environmental influence was a cir-
cumstance of time and place. Mitchell was a Senator from the State
of Maine. By replacing former Maine Senator Edmund Muskie in
1980, he followed one of the best known environmental activists
ever to serve at the federal level"0 and provided a continuity of ser-
7. Senator Mitchell was named to the newly created federal court position in
Bangor, Maine by President Jimmy Carter. See Jimmy Carter, II Pun. PAPERS 1397
(1979).
8. Summarizing Mitchell's Iran-Contra hearing statements, a commentator noted
that "[e]verything Mr. Mitchell says is in earnest; so is everything about him from
dark suit to furrowed brow. His words are selected carefully, spoken slowly. He
sounds like the judge he was before he was appointed to the Senate in 1980 .... "
George Mitchel, Insider with Clout, THE ECONO~MsT, Apr. 13, 1991, at 32. A local
commentator recently noted that "[e]verything George Mitchell said publicly had an
intellectual cadence-reason with political rhythm. Those lines marched. They still
do. He'll be missed as the senator from Maine." Sen. George Mitchell, BANcOR
DAmI.Y Nnws, Oct. 15, 1994.
9. Mitchell was considered one of President Clinton's possible Supreme Court
nominees. See Ted Gest and Kenneth T. Walsh, Life After Blackmun, U.S. Nnws
AND WoRILD REPORT, Apr. 18, 1994, at 28 (suggesting that Mitchell would lose his
political persona as a Supreme Court Justice); Jack W. Germond and Jules Witcover,
Sen. Mitchell Charts His Own Course, NAT'L J., Apr. 16, 1994, at 914 (claiming that
Mitchell is waiting for Chief Justice Rehnquist to retire). Mitchell declined the pos-
sible offer. See Douglas Jehl, Mitchell Rejects President's Offer of Seat on Court,
N.Y. Tuss, Apr. 13, 1994, at A-1.
10. Muskie is responsible for the original Clean Air Act and Clean water Act.
Muskie left the Senate in 1979 to serve as Secretary of State under President Jimmy
Carter after Cyrus R_ Vance resigned. See John Felton, Muskie Seen Helping Quiet
Hill Foreign Policy Discontent, 38 CONG. Q. WiuKY. 1155 (1980). Mitchell was
named to the seat by then Maine Governor Joseph Brennan. Muskie continues to
offer his support and advice to the environmental movement. See Edmund S. Mus-
kie, Reflections on a Quarter Century of Environmental Activism" On Postponing
Deadlines, Second-Guessing the Congress, and Ignoring Problems Until It Is Too
1995]
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vice unparalleled in the United States." In addition, Mitchell repre-
sented Maine, a state at the forefront of the environmental
protection movement. Mitchell's beliefs mirrored, protected, and
advanced those interests at the federal level.
Finally, Mitchell's leadership was unique when compared to past
majority leaders. 2 His Senate assignments and appointments reveal
a man who ascended quickly through the Senate ranks only to share
his power upon reaching the highest plateau of majority leader. In-
stead of accepting two positions regularly held by the majority
leader, he delegated the posts to other senators.' 3 His leadership
paralleled changes in history. 4 He fought for environmental legisla-
tion by serving on the Environment and Public Works Committee,
the Subcommittee on Clean Water, Fisheries and Wildlife, and the
Late, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 10081 (1988). In looking back at his environmental leader-
ship, Muskie concludes that "[i]t has been said that in the 1960s we asked for too
little, and that in the 1970s we asked for too much. The truth is that we have not
done enough." Id at 10082. He argues that the problems of the 1980s surfaced
largely because of regulatory ineptitude: "Now is not the time to settle for vague
generalities, to further postpone congressionally imposed deadlines or to blanch at
hard consequences of implementing the environmental cleanup the public has man-
dated .... " Id. at 10083. Reprinted in 133 CONG. REc. S. 17583 (daily ed. Dec. 9,
1987) (submitted by Senator Mitchell).
11. In an introductory profile of Mitchell, Congressional Quarterly prophesied
that "Mitchell ... is expected to follow closely Muskie's political stands in the Sen-
ate." 38 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1332 (1980). Two years later, he would leap into the
attempted Clean Air amendments. See Joseph A. Davis, Key Clean Air Compromise
Emerging in Senate Panel, 40 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1580 (1982) (Acid rain provisions
and amendments introduced by Mitchell); Joseph A. Davis, Committee Completes
Work on Clean Air Act Rewrite, 40 CONG. Q. WKLx. 2066 (1982) (reporting Clean
Air Rewrite out of Senate Environment and Public Works Committee on August 19
by a 15-1 vote). But see Joseph A. Davis, Chances Fading for Action On Clean Air
Act Rewrite Despite EPA Sanction Threat, 40 CONG. Q. WKLv. 2969 (1982) (spelling
doom for Clean Air Rewrite in congressional session).
12. For a historical perspective on the position of majority leader, see Senator
Robert C. Byrd, THE SENATE 1789-1989: ADDRESSES ON THE HISTORY OF THE
UNrrED STATES SENATE (1991). Byrd details a majority leader's duties as being the
party spokesman, receiving preferential recognition on the floor, securing unani-
mous consent agreements limiting debate time, making determinations of what will
be on the floor, and simply being on the floor for most of the session. Id. at 189-92.
13. Instead of accepting the Chairmanship of the Democratic Steering Commit-
tee, he named Daniel K. Inouye of Hawaii to the post. He asked Thomas A. Das-
chle of South Dakota to head the Democratic Policy Committee. "I've said I do not
intend to be a one-man band and I've meant it.... By involving more people in the
process, you tend to generate more support for whatever decisions the process
yields." Ronald D. Elving, Mitchell Will Try to Elevate Policy, Predictability, 46
CONG. Q. WKcLY. 3423 (1988).
14. Mitchell pondered: "Can a 200-year-old institution respond to such change?
We answer that question affirmatively every day. Throughout its existence, despite
its built-in bias against haste, the U.S. Senate has been a revolutionary body....
The Senate has been a guardian of tradition without becoming a barrier to change."
The Senate of 1989 and Beyond, S. Doc. No. 101-37, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1989).
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Subcommittee on Water Resources, Transportation and Economic
Development.
In 1984 Senator Mitchell was chosen to be Chairman of the Dem-
ocratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. 5 Only a few weeks after
the 1986 election, he was named deputy president pro tempore of
the Senate.'6 He was elected as the Majority Leader of the United
States Senate a scant two years later.17
Part II of this Comment tracks George Mitchell's role as a Sena-
tor in the development of the Clean Water Act Amendments of
1987. It briefly describes the provisions of the Amendments. Part
I describes Mitchell's work as Senate Majority Leader in passage
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and provides a brief
overview of those amendments. Part IV of this Comment presents
Mitchell's role as Senator from Maine in enacting the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990. It also describes the provisions of the Oil Pollution
Act.
15. In 1986, after the two-year chairmanship, the Democrats regained control of
the Senate by gaining eight seats to hold a ten seat edge. For his action in the Com-
mittee, see Two Savvy Coaches, NAT'L J., Nov. 1, 1986, at 2633 ("Mitchell has gained
a reputation for hard work and easy-going style and... he has spoken eloquently
about his party's need to do a better job of appealing to middle-class voters."); see
also Hays Gorey, A Hardball Player for the Senate; New Majority Leader Mitchell is
a Liberal with an Iron Will, TImE, Dec. 12, 1988, at 30 (pointing out that Mitchell
raised $12.4 million as head of the committee). In the race for majority leader, all of
the contenders made efforts to raise money for candidates. See David S. Cloud,
Hands-on Stylefor Heavyweight Fund-Raiser, 46 CoNG. Q. WxLx. 2785 (1988). The
author noted that Mitchell "often seemed like a one-man fundraising machine .... "
Id.
16. Senator Byrd, the existing majority leader, said that the position was awarded
to Mitchell for leading Democrats to the majority in the Senate. Senate Leaders
Selected, Party Chiefs Begin Committee Assignment Process, Daily Report For Exec-
utives (BNA) No. 225, at F-1 (Nov. 21, 1986).
17. For an extensive coverage of the election of Mitchell to the top post, see Ron-
ald D. Elving, Mitchell Will Try to Elevate Policy, Predictability, supra note 13.
Mitchell received 27 votes on the first ballot running against Senator J. Bennett
Johnston from Louisiana and Senator Daniel K. Inouye from Hawaii. The two sena-
tors then had Mitchell voted in by acclamation. Ronald D. Elving, Mitchell's Big
Vote Tally Shows Broad Support, 46 CONG. Q. WK.LY. 3425 (1988). See also Richard
E. Cohen, A Consensus Builder to Lead the Senate, NAT'L J., Dec. 3, 1988, at 3079
(Mitchell dispersed authority to others, including Inouye); Richard E. Cohen, Setting
the Senate Democrats' Agenda, NAT'L J., Feb. 25, 1989, at 484 (concluding that "the
evidence suggests that [Mitchell's] apparent caution in building a consensus ulti-
mately will yield a more dynamic and confident leadership."); Steven Manning, A
New Congress Gets Down to Business, SctoLAsmc UPDATE, Feb. 24, 1989, at 6




II. MITCHELL AS LAW MAKER:
THE WATER QUALITY Acr OF 1987
A. Passing the Water Quality Act of 1987
The original Clean Water Act was passed in 197218 to "restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters."' 9 A major overhaul of the Act was undertaken in
1977.20 The Clean Water Act seeks to control water pollution from
both point and non-point sources.
The clean water program uses three regulatory methods to
achieve control of pollution from point sources: effluent limitations,
water quality standards, and a complex permit system for pollution
discharges. 1 In addition, the Act authorizes the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to make grants to states, municipalities,
and other groups for the construction of waste treatment facilities
that are publicly and privately owned.' The statute limits the dura-
tion of the federal role in the grant program by phasing out federal
monies in favor of state-run revolving funds. Finally, enforcement is
achieved through a myriad of administrative, civil, and criminal pen-
alties levied against violators.23
Congress's intent is to reevaluate environmental statutes such as
the Clean Water Act periodically to ensure that the law reflects the
current state of ongoing scientific knowledge and changing circum-
stances. To this end, the 1977 reauthorization was designed to ex-
pire in 1982. However, the Clean Water Act was not reauthorized
by Congress until a full five years later, in 1987, due to heavy resist-
ance from the executive branch.24 This Section tracks the Clean
Water Act's journey to reauthorization as the Water Quality Act of
1987.
Senator Mitchell and several other staunchly environmental Sena-
tors guided the Clean Water bill into law despite a series of vetoes
by President Reagan. Senator Mitchell served as the Democratic
floor manager of the bill with Senator John Chafee of Rhode Island
as his Republican counterpart. In their hands, the Water Quality
Act of 1987 represented one of the first significant pieces of environ-
mental legislation to survive the arduous travel through the legisla-
18. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (amended 1977).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
20. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.
21. See JoHN HENRY DAVIDSON & ORLANDo DELOGU, 1 FEDERAL ENvIRoN.
MENTAL REGULATION 2-7 to 2-14 (1993).
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g)(1), (h) (1988).
23. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
24. For a historical summary of the legislative reauthorization, see Mary .
Houghton, The Clean Water Act Amendments of 1987, Envtl. Rptr. (BNA), Vol. 18,
No. 19, at 25-38 (Sept. 4, 1987).
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tive and executive branches during the 1980s. In particular, the
amendments signalled the willingness of Congress to begin to act as
environmental regulators in the face of a hostile administration and
an inactive EPA. The late 1980s saw the greening of Congress,
marked by the Water Quality Act of 1987.
Environmental progress came slowly, however. Historical
changes that ultimately marked the path for passage of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990 and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 had
not yet occurred. First, Mitchell's meteoric rise in the Senate only
had begun. Second, President Reagan was in the midst of his sec-
ond term. President Reagan's opposition to comprehensive envi-
ronmental regulation and the threat of a Presidential veto were
barriers to the passage of meaningful legislation during the early
1980s01 Nevertheless, Senator Mitchell and allied Senators guided
the Clean Water bill into law without President Reagan's approval.
Work on the reauthorization of the Clean Water Act began in ear-
nest in 1985.6 Early in that year, the Senate Environment and Pub-
lic Works Subcommittee on Environmental Protection approved a
bill that authorized $18 billion over the next nine years for the con-
struction of municipal sewage treatment facilities.2 7 The Senate bill
(S. 1128) also provided for $300 million in funding for the states'
development of non-point source pollution programs within eight-
een months of passage. The Senate committee retained the original
Clean Water Act's five-year term for wastewater discharge permits
25. Joseph A. Davis, Defending the Status Quo: Environmentalists Hold Edge as
Laws Come Up for Renewal, 43 CONG. Q. W.Y. 81 (1985) (noting that only one out
of ten environmental laws up for renewal had been renewed). Davis blamed the
ineffectiveness of the Clean Water Act on the Environmental Protection Agency by
noting that "The 1972 Clean Water Act, for example, required EPA to set up a 'pre-
treatment' program for regulating the discharge of pollutants by industry into mu-
nicipal sewage systems. More than a decade later, EPA has yet to succeed in coming
up with a workable program." Id.
26. Houghton, supra note 24. Previous attempts had failed. The Senate Environ-
ment and Public Works Committee held hearings in 1982. No legislative action
flowed from the committee. A bill was reported by the Senate in 1983, but various
filibuster threats kept the bill from being voted on in that year. It at 25. See also
Joseph A. Davis, House Panel Ducks Fight on Offshore Leasing, 43 CONG. Q. WaxY.
803 (1985) (noting progress of bill).
27. Houghton, supra note 24, at 26. The Administration opposed this type of
funding and sought to limit the funding to $6 billion with the hope of ending the
program before 1994. Id. See also Joseph A. Davis, Reagan Seeking Phase-out:
Clean Water Debate to Focus on Sewage Grant Program, 43 CONG. Q. WVuy. 491
(1985) (noting that the Senate was charting the middle course between the House
and Administration proposals for funding levels). In the beginning of his presi-
dency, Reagan argued that the program should not last forever. Congress obliged,
but "[w]hile it was nowhere written into the law, members from both parties in both
chambers believed they had an agreement with the administration to fund the re-
maining $23 billion in needs at $2.4 billion annually over the next 10 years." I& See
infra text accompanying note 48.
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instead of extending it to ten years as was provided for in the House
bill.
On May 2, 1985, the Senate Environment and Public Works Com-
mittee reported S. 1128 by a 13-2 vote and prepared to put the bill
on the floor of the Senate.2" A major conflict arose at the commit-
tee level over the allocation formula for individual state funding for
the sewer grants.29 Another source of conflict was the bill's modifi-
cation of the EPA practice of granting toxic pollutant variances to
certain businesses, as had been approved by the Supreme Court in
Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil.3° As the bill neared floor consideration, EPA Administrator
Lee Thomas sent a letter to Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole
outlining the Reagan Administration's disapproval of the bill in its
committee format. Thomas openly criticized the bill's funding levels
for phase-out of the municipal sewage treatment facility construc-
tion grants and for non-point source pollution programs.31 Mitchell
reviewed the successes of the federalization of water pollution con-
trol in order to respond to this criticism.32
28. See Joseph A. Davis, Floor Fight Likely Over Sewer Grants: Senate Commit-
tee Approves Renewal of Clean Water Act, 43 CONG. Q. WKLY. 863 (1985).
29. See Houghton, supra note 24, at 26. The two dissenters, Dave Durenberger
of Minnesota and New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, disagreed with the
adoption of a new formula to allocate construction grant money to the states. id.
30. 470 U.S. 116 (1985). In that case, Justice White concluded that both statutory
language and legislative history permitted the EPA's interpretation that it had au-
thority to grant variances for effluent limitations on the basis of fundamentally dif-
ferent factors under section 301(1) of the Clean Water Act. Id. at 129-30. See 33
U.S.C. § 1311(n) (1988). For a discussion of fundamentally different factors, see Da-
vidson, supra note 21, at 2-22 to 2-23; William Funk, The Exception That Approves
the Rule: FDF Variances under the Clean Water Act, 13 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REv. 1
(1985). Congress enacted strict specifications on these variances, such as placing the
burden of proof on the company and not allowing the businesses to use cost as a
reason for departure from the guidelines. See Davis, supra note 28, at 864. Mitchell
commented that "[w]hile there is currently no basis for the regulations in the act, the
conferees concluded that some expansion of the Administrator's authority in this
area is an appropriate addition to the act." 133 CONG. Rac. S739 (daily ed. Jan. 14,
1987). See also 133 CONG. REc. H131, H136-37 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1987), reprinted In
1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5,22.
31. Houghton, supra note 24, at 27-28. The Administration's main argument was
that these types of monies should have come from the states. Thomas expounded
that "[e]xperience ... argues against a federal responsibility in non-point source
control implementation." Id. at 27. See also Joseph A. Davis, Conflict with Reagan
on Sewer Grants: Clean Water Act Renewal Awaits House, Senate Action, 43 CONG.
Q. WKLY. 1009 (1985).
32. My response to that is that before 1972 we did not have any significant
Federal program to deal with the problem of water pollution in our coun-
try. And as a result, almost every major river in the United States was a
stinking, open sewer.... Since 1972, since we passed the Federal Clean
Water Act, hundreds and hundreds of American rivers have been cleaned
up. And the American people overwhelmingly want this program to
continue.
133 CONG. R-c. S1005-06 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1987) (statement by Senator Mitchell).
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The floor fight reflected these main committee issues. Several
senators attempted to amend the bill because their home states
would receive diminished funding under the new allocation formula
prescribed by the Senate committee. Mitchell and Rhode Island
Senator John Chafee realized that the allocation formula was a
thorny issue, as it had been throughout the committee process. To
avoid a possible filibuster, Mitchell and Chafee drafted a compro-
mise provision that retreated slightly from the committee bill but
did not give the opponents all that they had desired. On June 13,
1985, the Senate passed its compromise bill by a unanimous vote.
The House subsequently passed its version of the bill by a wide mar-
gin.33 The conference to resolve the differences between the two
bills progressed slowly, however, and the process remained at a vir-
tual standstill for an entire year.'
The conferees finally compromised by once again altering the
formula for state funding. In addition, several other substantive
amendments were made to the conference bill.35 At the completion
of the conference, competing sides both claimed victory. Environ-
mentalists lauded the conference bill's inclusion of the Senate's five-
year renewals of pollution discharge permits; the House bill would
have extended that time frame to ten years. The compromise bill
also adopted the Senate's recommendation of $18 million to fund
the construction grant program; President Reagan could claim this
as partial vindication because the money allocated was less than the
amount provided by the House version, and the program still would
be taken over by the states in 1994.
A conference between members of the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives usually signals the end of the legislative process. Often
the final vote is uneventful. In this case, however, the two years of
work reflected in the conference bill were merely the beginning of
the fight for the new Clean Water Act. Flirting with the end of the
Congressional session, Congress passed the conference bill unani-
mously.36 President Reagan, however, exercised his pocket veto
power, refusing to act on the bill, and the veto became effective two
days after the biannual Congressional elections. 37 In his pocket veto
33. The House measure passed by a vote of 340-83. Joseph A. Davis, House
Refuses FY '86 Freeze on Spending for Clean Water, 43 CONo. Q. WKLY. 1481, 1482
(1985).
34. See Janet Hook, Congress Heads for Grand Legislative Finale, 44 CONG. Q.
Wrmy. 1960, 1969 (1986) (noting that one of the major problems in conference was
how the funding would be divided among the states).
35. See Houghton, supra note 24, at 31-33.
36. Joseph A. Davis, Congress Votes Unanimously for $20 Billion Water Cleanup,
44 CONG. Q. Wiu.Y. 2623 (1986). The House approval occurred on October 15 by a
vote of 408-0, and the Senate passed the conference bill the next day 96-0. Id.
37. See Pocket Veto Possible for Clean Water Bill, 44 CONG. Q. W.Y. 2799
(1986) (noting that although the conference bill cleared Congress on October 16, the
bill did not arrive at the White House until October 25. "Senate officials say the bill
1995]
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message, the President explained his fiscal dissatisfaction with the
bill:
S. 1128 ... would authorize... the reinstatement of a Federal
financial assistance program to pay for local plans to control
diffuse sources of pollution. Over $500 million was spent on a
similar program between 1973 and 1981, with little or no posi-
tive result. Restarting expensive planninA grant programs that
have failed in the past is not justifiable.
The 100th Congress convened on January 6, 1987. The Senate
waited two weeks to bring the legislation to a vote.39 When it did,
on January 21, 1987, the Senate as predicted quickly passed the
Water Quality Act of 1987. During the floor debate, the Reagan
Administration offered a substitute provision. Introduced by Ma-
jority Leader Dole, it would have reduced the funding for sewage
construction grants by $6 billion and cut back money for non-point
source pollution programs.40 Mitchell assisted in the defeat of this
bill by exhorting that "[t]he President does not need this fight. We
do not want this fight. The American people will not benefit from
this fight. The American people want clean water. '41 Senator
Mitchell seized the opportunity to speak about the environmental
legislation he had guided on the floor:
The current bill is in fact a modest, responsible compromise
between the very large costs of the many needed projects, on
the one hand, and the need to control spending, on the other
hand. Accepting this substitute would not be a compromise.
It would be a failure of the Congress to meet its
responsibility.42
Senate members, including Senator Dole, complained that the
federal government was intervening in state and local land use plan-
got caught in the backlog of paperwork that always follows adjournment."); see also
Joseph A. Davis, Reagan Vetoes Clean Water Bill" Members Vow to Pass It Again, 44
CONG. Q. WKLY. 2874 (1986) (explaining the pocket veto).
38. Ronald Reagan, Memorandum of Disapproval of the Bill Amending the Clean
Water Act, II PUB. PAPERS 1529 (1986).
39. Democrats in the Senate agreed to wait until after President Reagan's State
of the Union Address. In return, the Senate Republicans agreed not to try to block
the veto. Amy Stern, In Gesture to President Reagan, Senate Delays Clean Water
Vote, 45 CONG. Q. WKLY. 116 (1987).
40. Mitchell noted that the "administration bill would replace direct authoriza-
tions with a scheme allowing States to use a part of their construction grant funds...
to support nonpoint programs. This is asking States to rob Peter to pay Paul. These
funds are committed years in advance to specific community projects." 133 CONG.
REc. S914 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1987).
41. 133 CONG. REc. S769 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1987) (debating Senator Robert
Dole's substitute bill).
42. 133 CONG. REc. S913 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1987) (statement by Senator Mitchell
on the Dole substitute bill).
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ning decisions by dealing with non-point source pollution.43 Mitch-
ell defended the legislation by focusing on the severity of the non-
point source problem and the bill's efforts to curb it.44 Mitchell
reassured Senators that the EPA would do no assessments unless
the states failed to act within the allotted time period.4- Further, if
the EPA were required to act, the effort would be aimed only at
garnering national data on non-point source pollution.4 The Dole
amendment was defeated 82-17.
The bill Congress then considered was virtually identical to the
one pocket vetoed by President Reagan in late 1986. On the Senate
floor Mitchell criticized the Reagan Administration harshly, repeat-
edly arguing that it was trying to duck responsibility for a funding
commitment made six years earlier.47 Mitchell saw this veto and
opposition as contravening that earlier commitment: "And so
Members of the Senate, President Reagan's veto of this bill last year
.. is a breach of that understanding; it is a violation of that agree-
ment; it is a reneging on that commitment." 8 The vast majority of
members from both parties agreed with Mitchell. Unfortunately,
President Reagan once more exercised his veto power, despite Con-
gressional pressure to sign the bill.49 An impatient House of Repre-
43. See Senate Approves Water Act Reauthorization; Leaders Claim Margin to
Override Presidential Veto, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 14, at A-21 (Jan.
22, 1987). The fact that decreasing non-point source pollution requires changes in
land use is supported by commentators. "[N]on-point sources are not thought to be
susceptible to correction by technology, but instead require changes in the way land
is used for such activities as forestry, agriculture, mining, and construction." DAVID-
soN & Dntoou, supra note 21, at 2-5, citing John H. Davidson, Little Waters: The
Relationship Between Water Pollution and Agricultural Drainage, 17 ENvr.T L. REP.
10074 (1987).
44. Mitchell joined other Senators in pointing out the threat of non-point source
pollution by noting that "the bill provides for State programs to identify and control
nonpoint source pollution, such as runoff from city streets and agricultural lands.
These nonpoint sources of pollution are thought to cause over half of the remaining
water pollution problems." 133 CONG. REc. S19 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987). Mitchell
defended the bill against the criticism that the federal government was planning land
use.
[C]haracterization of this legislation as Federal land use planning is totally
unfounded and incorrect... I want to point out that this section was care-
fully designed in long negotiations with House conferees. We responded to
those who expressed concern about Federal intervention in local deci-
sions.... The nonpoint source provision is [sic] our bill is balanced and
workable.
133 CONG. Rc. S915 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1987).
45. 133 CONG. R c. S914 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1987).
46. Id.
47. For information on the commitment, see supra note 27.
48. 133 CONG. Rnc. S767 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1987).
49. In his veto message on January 30, President Reagan stated that the non-
point source pollution program
threatens to become the ultimate whip hand for Federal regulators. For
example, in participating States, if farmers have more run-off from their
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sentatives scheduled a veto override vote for February 3, 1987, and
the Senate scheduled their vote for a day later.50 The votes were
consistent. The House overrode the veto 401-26, and the Senate
blocked the veto by an 86-14 vote.51 While the obvious tension be-
tween the executive and legislative branches at that time explained
the voting pattern,5 2 Mitchell believed that the bill succeeded on its
environmental merits, not through politics.5 3 In support of this
view, Mitchell ardently defended the legislation against the Presi-
dent's argument that the bill was essentially legislative "pork."5 4
Mitchell's contributions to the passage of the Water Quality Act
of 1987 were extraordinary. First, Mitchell acted as one of the floor
managers of the legislation. By guiding the bill on the floor, he was
able to push the legislation to a series of votes and to craft com-
promises to gain enough votes to overcome a filibuster and a presi-
dential veto. The one-sided vote is evidence of Mitchell's ability to
work out a compromise on the allocation formula, funding for the
construction grant program, and a more comprehensive non-point
source pollution program. In passing the Water Quality Act of 1987,
Senator George Mitchell demonstrated his ability to work with his
colleagues to pass lengthy, detailed environmental legislation in the
face of formidable opposition.55
land than the Environmental Protection Agency decides is right, that
Agency will be able to intrude into decisions such as how and where the
farmers must plow their fields, what fertilizers they must use, and what
kind of cover crops they must plant.
Ronald Reagan, Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Ap-
proval the Water Quality Act of 1987, I PuB. PAPERS 95 (1987). See also Sent by the
President Jan. 30: President Reagan's Message On Veto of Clean Water Act, 45 CoNo.
Q. WK.Y. 253 (1987).
50. Capital Boxscore: Reagan Vetoes Clean Water Bill, 45 CoNG. Q. W.Lv. 214
(1987).
51. Joseph A. Davis, Only 40 Members Back Reagan: Congress Easily Overrides
Veto of $20 Billion Clean Water Bill, 45 CONG. Q. WKLY. 240 (1987).
52. See James M. Strock, The Congress and the President: From Confrontation to
Creative Tension, 17 ENvTL. L. REP. 10006 (1987).
53. Davis, supra note 51.
54. Id Mitchell pointed out that although almost every state would receive fund-
ing for specific projects, they "address truly unique circumstances, posing serious
environmental threats, which are beyond the reach of standard clean water pro-
grams." Id He noted that "[i]f Congress proposes it, it's pork.. . if the president
proposes it, it's roast sirloin." Id. See also Congress Overrides Reagan's Veto by Big
Margin to Renew Clean Water Act Into 1990s, Daily Report for Executives (BNA)
No. 23, at A-13 (Feb. 5, 1987) (pointing out Mitchell's conclusion that all of the
special projects included in the passed bill were also included in the administration
substitute bill).
55. See, eg., Strock, supra note 52. In the middle of the legislative and executive
volleying of the Water Quality Act, Strock suggested that "the Reagan Administra-
tion should mitigate the mistrust engendered by its early environmental record ....
[Tihe apparent lack of White House concern for environmental matters has never
been wholly dispelled." Id. at 10008.
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B. Provisions of the Water Quality Act of 1987
This section presents a brief overview of the Water Quality Act of
198756 and its implications for the continuing improvement of water
quality. This section also includes a description of criticisms of the
legislation. Although this section focuses on the bill's construction
grant program and efforts to curb non-point source pollution, the
Water Quality Act of 1987 also provided for extended compliance
deadlines to accommodate the EPA's delay in establishing guide-
lines. Additionally, the 1987 amendments also included allowances
for permit modifications, increased penalties for violations, and new
programs to deal with toxic pollution "hot spots."
The construction grant program's purpose is "to require and to
assist the development and implementation of waste treatment man-
agement plans and practices."'  As described in the last section, the
amendments to the grant program engendered the most controversy
during consideration of the bill.5" Under the amendments, the capi-
talization of state loan programs is financed at a top level of $9.6
billion until 1990, with a cap of $8.4 billion for 1990 to 1994.59 The
EPA Administrator must enter into a written agreement with the
grant applicant that specifically states which items of a particular
project are eligible for federal monies.' The 1987 amendments con-
tain the allotment formula providing funding amounts for each
state.61 At least one commentator concluded that this final provi-
sion for construction grants actually was quite positive for both the
legislative and executive branches.'
The 1987 amendments also tackle new sources of pollution. The
Water Quality Act states that "it is the national policy that programs
for the control of non-point sources of pollution be developed and
implemented in an expeditious manner so as to enable the goals of
this Act to be met . -.63 To that end, section 316 of the Water
Quality Act was drafted to deal with non-point source water pollu-
tion. Non-point source pollution is identified as pollution that does
56. For a section-by-section analysis, see 133 CONG. REC. H131 (daily ed. Jan. 7.
1987) reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5 (prepared by the late New Jersey Represen-
tative James T. Howard, Chair of the House Committee on Public Works and Trans-
portation) [hereinafter Clean Water Legislative History].
57. 33 U.S.C. § 1281(a) (1988).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 29, 33.
59. See 33 U.S.C. § 1285 (1988).
60. Id. § 1283(a)(2).
61. Id. § 1285(c)(3).
62. "The Construction Grants program was a major piece of compromise legisla-
tion. It did authorize direct grants at a much higher level than President Reagan
desired .... " Lawrence R. Liebesman and Eliott P. Laws, The Water Quality Act of
1987: A Major Step in Assuring the Quality of the Nation's Waters, 17 ENvm. L REP.
10311, 10314 (1987). The author pointed out, however, that the program is eventu-
ally phased out at the federal level Id. at 10312.
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(7) (1988).
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not come from a single, identifiable source. The Clean Water Act
defines "point source" as "any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel,
tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, con-
centrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft,
from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 64 Congress pro-
vided $400 million over four years to study and implement non-
point source management programs.6' The EPA must provide an-
nual reports to Congress on the success of programs concerning
non-point source pollution in the states.66
Both opponents and proponents of the amendments criticized the
non-point source pollution program included in the Water Quality
Act of 1987. Legal commentators portrayed the non-point source
pollution program as inadequate,67 while President Reagan's attack
on the legislation centered on fiscal and federalism concerns. The
President believed the programs should be left entirely to the states
because the federal government simply could not afford to finance
64. Id. § 1362(14). Mitchell has defined non-point source pollution as caused "by
general runoff, rather than discharge from a specific pipe." 133 CONG. REc. S734
(daily ed. Jan. 14, 1985) (statement by Senator Mitchell).
65. 33 U.S.C. § 1329() (1988). Each state had to submit a report within 18
months of enactment that was subject to the approval of the Administrator within
the following 180 days. Id. § 1329(c)(2). If a state failed to submit a report, then
EPA could prepare one for that state. Id. § 1329(d)(3).
66. See Clean Water Legislative History, supra note 56, at 32.
67. See Robert D. Fentress, Comment, Nonpoint Source Pollution, Groundwater,
and the 1987 Water Quality Act: Section 208 Revisited?, 19 ENvmL. L. 807 (1989). The
author criticized the section 319 amendment to the Clean Water Act since it estab-
lishes a voluntary program for the states. Id. at 838. However, he also acknowl-
edged, "If little or no progress is made by the states under section 319 in controlling
the NPS problem, and Congress is serious ... it will use the information provided by
the states under section 319's reporting requirements to justify stronger measures."
It. See also William F. Pedersen, Jr., Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 EcoL-
OGY L.Q. 69 (1988) (stating that "[t]he statutory revisions enacted in 1987 ... do
little more than mirror the inherited structure"); John H. Davidson, Thinking About
Nonpoint Sources of Water Pollution and South Dakota Agriculture, 34 S.D. L. REv.
20 (1989). Davidson notes that the 1987 non-point source program "is a start, [but]
it is far from being dramatic or decisive; arguably, it leaves any resulting improve-
ment in water quality entirely to the political will of individual states." Id. at 43.
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his program.' Some critics focused on the specific effects the new
section could have on home states.69
These criticisms, however, should not cloud the fact that this
amendment to the Clean Water Act is the legislative branch's most
comprehensive step ever regarding non-point source pollution. 7°
Such criticisms reflect the nature and meaning of compromise in the
legislative branch. The non-point source pollution efforts in the
Water Quality Act of 1987 represent a mandate defining the middle
ground between the fiscal conservatives, who believed the monetary
cost was too high to do more, and environmentalists and scholars,
who believed the environmental cost of neglecting non-point source
problems was too high not to do more.
The 1987 Act extended compliance dates for standards due to the
EPA's delay in establishing certain guidelines. Deadlines were
delayed for effluent limitations on "priority toxic pollutants, conven-
tional pollutants, and non-conventional pollutants [to] three years
after EPA promulgates the limits .... 71 Congress realized the ne-
cessity of directing the EPA to set the limitations in a timely fashion
so that deadlines could be met. To that end, the Water Quality Act
of 1987 directs the EPA Administrator "to promulgate such limita-
tions as expeditiously as possible."'
The 1987 amendments also allow for modifications to permits de-
tailing discharge limitations under certain circumstances. For in-
stance, permit modifications may be made for nonconventional
pollutants such as ammonia, chlorine, color, iron, and total phenols
under certain conditions. 73 Discharges from publicly owned treat-
68. President Reagan delivered his veto message in late January. "Let me re-
peat--controlling non-point source pollution has the potential to touch, in the most
intimate ways, practically all of us as citizens, whether farmers, business people, or
homeowners. I do not believe State programs should be subject to Federal control."
Reagan, supra note 49, at 96. Senator Mitchell's consistent response was that this
view was erroneous. "It is the intention of the conferees that grants to States be
used to implement.... Grants are not intended to be used to support the develop-
ment of such programs or plans. The conferees expect that States will use State
resources to develop nonpoint plans and programs." 132 CONG. REC. S16432 (daily
ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (statement of Senator Mitchell).
69. See, eg., Davidson, supra note 67. Davidson points out that since "agricul-
tural practices are the principal source of nonpoint source pollution, and there is
increasing evidence that a substantial percentage of all water pollution falls into the
nonpoint source category, these changes are likely to have a disproportionate and
significant impact on South Dakota agriculture." Id. at 21.
70. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f) (1988). This was the only non-point source provision
existing before the 1987 amendments to the Act.
71. See id. § 1311(b)(2)(C)-(E). In no event could they be finished later then
March 31, 1989. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(C).
72. 133 CONG. REc. H131, H135 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1987).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g)(1) (1988). The operator or owner must show the Admin-
istrator that compliance will still occur, no other sources will be subjected to addi-
tional requirements as a result of the modification, and the modification will not
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ment works into marine waters may be modified if a list of nine
conditions is met to the satisfaction of the Administrator and the
State.74 In addition, Congress created a new provision that affirmed
and modified an existing non-statutory EPA administrative program
dealing with compliance variances for businesses, based on the fun-
damentally different factors of different businesses.75
Increased use of penalties to compel enforcement was a major
part of the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act.7 6 The EPA
and the Secretary of the Army obtained new authority to assess ad-
ministrative penalties for violations of the Act.77 These administra-
tive penalties are divided into two classes. Class I has a cap of
$10,000 per violation, and the maximum penalty in Class II is
$10,000 per day for each violation, with total limits of $25,000 and
$125,000, respectively.78 The EPA Administrator or Secretary of
the Army examines such factors as the "nature, circumstances, ex-
tent and gravity of the violation, or violations, and, with respect to
the violator, ability to pay, any prior history of such violations, the
degree of culpability, economic benefit or savings (if any) resulting
from the violation, and such other matters as justice may require."'7
The amendments increased the civil penalty amount from $10,000
per day to $25,000 per day for violations of effluent limitations,
water quality-related effluent limitations, toxic and pre-treatment
effluent standards, the Clean Lakes Program, and the disposal or
"interfere with the attainment or maintenance of that water quality which shall as-
sure protection of public water supplies, and the protection and propagation of a
balanced population of shellfish, fish, and wildlife .... Id § 1311(g)(2)(C). Pollu-
tants can also be added to the list of pollutants whose discharge may be modified.
See id. § 1311 (g)(4)(A), (B)(i).
74. Id. § 1311(h).
75. Congress tightened the EPA's ability to grant these permits in response to the
Supreme Court's ruling in Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources De-
fense Counsel, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985). "The conferees intend ... that the Admin-
istrator use the new authority in this section sparingly .... [This section] should not
be used to generally relax or retreat from national, minimum requirements for an
industry." 133 CONG. REc. S739 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1987) (statement of Sen. Mitch-
ell). The legislative history spells out the factors upon which to base variances.
"These factors include the age of equipment and facilities, the process employed, the
engineering aspect of the type of control techniques, process changes and other fac-
tors deemed appropriate by the administrator. The bill specifically excludes consid-
eration of costs ... as a basis for establishing a fundamental difference with regard
to an individual facility." 133 CONG. REc. H131, H136 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1987).
76. Senator Mitchell commented that "[t]his provision will substantially increase
the agency's authority to assure full enforcement of the act." 133 CoNG. REc. S742
(daily ed. Jan. 14, 1987). For a pre-1987 history of the enforcement provisions, see
William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional Prescription
for Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEo. WAsH. L. Rv.
202 (1987).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (1988).
78. Id § 1319(g)(2).
79. Id § 13 19(g)( 3 ).
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use of sewage sludge."0 Authorities are directed to look at factors
similar to the previous administrative guidelines to determine penal-
ties.8" Congress also enacted increased criminal penalties for negli-
gent and knowing violations.'
In response to the concern that special controls, beyond existing
statutory guidelines, would be needed in order to control particu-
larly hazardous pollution, the legislation addresses toxic "hot
spots."' s Under this new section, states must "identify those water
bodies within or adjacent to them which will not meet State water
quality standards because of toxic pollutants after the implementa-
tion of [Best Available Technology], new source performance stan-
dards and pretreatment standards."'  The states then must provide
individual control strategies for dealing with these pollutants.s If
no strategy is developed by February 4, 1989, the EPA is directed to
promulgate a strategy for the state in question."
In conclusion, the Water Quality Act of 1987 is an ambitious set
of amendments that assists in the prevention of future water pollu-
tion. Despite the fact that the non-point source management pro-
gram has been criticized as too soft to be effective, the constraints of
compromise inherent in the legislative process demanded that
states' rights be respected. Former EPA Deputy Administrator Re-
becca Hanmer notes that the State requirements and the focus on
water quality are the two special parts of the Act.' These amend-
ments passed as the result and the completion of a lengthy process.
Senator Mitchell, as floor manager, passed the important and over-
due Clean Water Act of 1987 in the face of unyielding opposition
from the Reagan administration.
80. I& § 1319(d). Several courts have used this section extensively: Sasser v. Ad-
ministrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency, 990 F.2d 127 (4th Cir.
1993) (upholding jurisdiction of Administrator where landowner discharged pollu-
tants into wetlands without a permit); United States v. Confederate Acres Sanitary
Sewer and Drainage System, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 834 (V.D. Ky. 1990) (holding that
$17,000 penalty was adequate because that was the approximate benefit from the
violation); United States v. Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. 684 (D. NJ. 1987) (affirming
$1,000 a day penalty for developer who filled in federal wetlands area even after
being made aware of their existence).
81. 33. U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988).
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(1) (1988).
84. 133 CoNG. Rc. H131, H136 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1982).
85. Id See 33 U.S.C. § 13140)(1)(D) (1988). 'The Administrator then has 120
days after the February 4, 1989 deadline to approve the plan. Id. § 13140)(2).
86. 1& § 1314(1)(3).
87. See Houghton, supra note 24, at 4.
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III. MITCHELL AS MAJORITY LEADER: THE CLEAN AIR Acr
AMENDMENTS OF 1990
A. Passing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
Beginning in 1980, Senator Mitchell fought for laws to protect the
country from air pollution. In October 1994, he summarized his be-
liefs on the subject: "We will either agree to control and reduce
pollution and take the necessary steps to achieve that result, or we
will continue to suffer from air pollution. Those are the choices
available."' s Mitchell expended enormous energy in passing the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The early 1980s were a bleak
decade for clean air advocates seeking to pass new legislation. After
the 1977 reauthorization of the Clean Air Act expired in 1982, clean
air legislation died in committee each session until the late 1980s,
when clean air advocates found new hope. Their renewed optimism
sprang from two sources. First, Senator Mitchell was elected major-
ity leader in 1988. Second, the Reagan Administration gave way to
the environmentally friendlier Bush Administration.89 This transi-
tion guaranteed a better dialogue between the White House and
Congress in Washington. While these two events set the stage, the
passage of comprehensive clean air legislation required hard work
from Congress and the President.
President Bush introduced clean air legislation in 1989 to fulfill a
campaign pledge, but Congress discarded the President's draft after
considerable criticism and rallied instead behind its members' own
separate bills. Senator Mitchell guided the committee process and
defended the final legislative product from harmful amendments on
the floor. That work precipitated one of the Senator's most difficult
and controversial actions during his tenure as majority leader. Dur-
ing tense moments early in the floor debate when the bill looked
vulnerable to a filibuster, Mitchell yanked it off the floor and con-
vened three weeks of late night negotiations in his office in order to
save the bill. These unusually secret negotiations resulted in a com-
promise. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 included acid
rain provisions in a separate, new title, reflecting Mitchell's commit-
88. George J. Mitchell, Spending for the Air We Breathe, BANGOR DAILY NEWS,
Oct. 15, 1994.
89. George Bush campaigned as a friend of the environment. See George Bush,
George Bush on the Environment, 18 ENvTL. REP. 10293 (1988). In contrast,
Rochelle L. Stanfield points to the regulatory resistance provided by the opponents
of acid rain legislation during the Reagan Administration:
By stubborn adherence to the refrain that the link between coal-burning
boilers and acid rain damage has yet to be proved and, therefore, that ex-
pensive control legislation might be wasteful, their representatives in Con-
gress and the Reagan Administration have been able to hold off acid rain
legislation for six years.
Rochelle L. Stanfield, Air of Zealotry, NAT'L. J., Aug. 1, 1987, at 2003.
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ment to the State of Maine and rewarding efforts throughout his
career to pass acid rain provisions.
Acid rain was not a new legislative subject in 1990, and Senator
Mitchell personally had been considering the problem for the previ-
ous decade.90 Congress passed the Acid Precipitation Act in 1980.91
This legislation formed the National Acid Precipitation Assessment
Program, which was required to study the acid rain problem and
report its findings and subsequent recommendations to Congress.
Senator Mitchell introduced the first bill to control acid rain in
1981.2 In fact, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works reported acid rain legislation, mostly sponsored by Mitchell,
in 1982, 1984, and 1987.91 Unfortunately, until the late 1980s the
prospects of an acid rain bill or a larger Clean Air Reauthorization
bill moving past a committee vote were distant. In 1987, however,
compliance deadlines for standards set out in the 1977 amendments
would take effect. As some in Congress sought to extend these
mandated deadlines, a window of opportunity opened for the legis-
lators during 1987 to argue that the entire Clean Air Act needed to
be reviewed and updated.
In January of that year, Mitchell introduced an acid rain proposal
that gave states a sufficient amount of time to develop acid rain pro-
grams and called for a national reduction of the emission of twelve
million tons of sulfur dioxide and four million tons of nitrogen oxide
90. His convictions were apparent in the first few weeks of his tenure in the Sen-
ate. When Congress was considering legislation which would reduce foreign oil con-
sumption by favoring coal, Mitchell was astounded that the bill ignored the
environment: "It was a good proposal but I was shocked to find out it had no envi-
ronmental protection provision in it." Mary Kate Cranston, States News Service,
July 31, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8912 (1988). See also 42 U.S.C. § 7403G) (Supp. IV 1992).
92. The bill, S. 1706, would have required a ten million ton reduction in annual
sulfur dioxide emissions in thirty-one midwestern and eastern states by 1990. At
that time, those states emitted approximately twenty-four million tons of sulfur diox-
ide a year. See Lawrence Mosher, Congress May Have to Resolve Stalled U.S.-Cana-
dian Acid Rain Negotiations, NAT'L J., Mar. 13,1982, at 456. Mitchell, trying to fight
the Reagan Administration's complacency, stated to EPA assistant administrator
Kathleen M. Bennett, "What I would like to know is when will you have enough
information to say, 'All right, we have studied it enough now. We know enough.
Here is what we should do.'" l Bennett responded: "Within two to three years,
we expect to have some very important findings that will help guide us .... It is
possible that those will suggest further activities that are necessary, and it is possible
they won't." Id.
93. See S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2nd. Sess. 4 (1989), reprinted n 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,3390. Mitchell's amended 1982 bill required an eight million ton
reduction in annual sulfur dioxide emissions with different deadlines depending on
the use of conventional approaches, innovative technologies, or the use of low-sulfur




into the atmosphere. 4 Introducing the bill, Mitchell stated, "[A]s I
have in each Congress since I joined the Senate, I am today intro-
ducing acid rain legislation. I hope this is the last time I will have to
do so."95 Although Mitchell's past bills had been aimed at only
thirty-one Eastern states, Mitchell now argued that acid rain was a
national problem that called for a bill that was national in scope.96
Consequently, he sought to require national reductions in both sul-
fur dioxide and nitrogen oxide.97
The bill was sent to the Senate Subcommittee on Environmental
Protection. Mitchell, the sub-committee chairperson, held hearings
on the bill in June 1987.98 On June 10, Mitchell introduced a bill to
extend the compliance deadlines that were to take effect at the end
of 1987.99 The bills were approved by Mitchell's subcommittee as
part of comprehensive Clean Air Act amendments by an 11-0
94. 133 CONG. REc. S865 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1987) (statement by Senator Mitchell
introducing S. 321).
95. d See also Sen. Mitchell Offers Acid Rain Bill Giving States Wide Flexibility
in Achieving Reductions, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 13, at A2 (Jan. 21,
1987) (noting that the bill required states to develop plans to cut emissions in two
years and directed the President to negotiate with Canada and Mexico regarding air
pollution).
96. 133 CONG. REC. S865 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1987) (statement by Senator
Mitchell).
97. Id. Mitchell stated that "[i]n some respects this bill is more stringent than
those I have introduced in the past. But the need is more urgent than ever.... This
is the beginning of a process that I hope will conclude with passage of acid rain
legislation in this Congress." Id. Mitchell produced evidence to substantiate his
view. On February 3, health experts testified before a Senate panel about the exten-
sive damage resulting from acid rain. Acid Rain Components Damage Human
Health at Existing Levels, Four Health Experts Tell Senate Panel, Daily Report for
Executives (BNA) No. 22, at A-8 (Feb. 4, 1987) (summarizing findings from four
health experts from the American Public Health Association, the American Lung
Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and Mt. Sinai Medical Center In
New York City).
98. Mary Kate Cranston, States News Service, June 5, 1987, available In LEXIS,
Nexis Library, News File (noting that Mitchell scheduled the hearings during a
break from the Iran-Contra hearings); Witnesses Praise Mitchell Air Act Plan at
Hearing, but Issue Caveats on Controls, Loopholes, Daily Report for Executives
(BNA) No. 115, at A-10 (June 17, 1987). The author noted that "each witness
pressed for changes to accommodate a special interest." Id Mitchell exhorted to
"those who say they should not be responsible for reductions, I ask: 'Who will con-
trol their emissions if you do not control yours?'" Id
99. Sen. Mitchell Offers Clean Air Act Extension Bill; New Deadlines Tied to Pol-
lution Control, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 111, at A-3 (June 11, 1987).
Mitchell estimated that about seventy areas would fail to meet the ozone and carbon
monoxide deadlines at the end of 1987. Id
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vote.100 On July 29, the fifth title concerning air toxics passed the
subcommittee.101
The Reagan Administration remained equivocal on the subject of
acid rain during the early part of 1987. On March 18, 1987, Presi-
dent Reagan proposed $2.5 billion in spending over five years to
study new technology to combat acid rain."~ In early April, Presi-
dent Reagan traveled to Canada for an annual summit, and dis-
cussed, among other things, acid rain, but no new agreements on
acid rain were reached. 03 Moreover, in July of 1987, EPA Adminis-
trator Lee Thomas criticized Mitchell's bill as too expensive and
lacking scientific accuracy.1°4 Senator Mitchell countered by stating,
"[t]his committee has heard for seven years the chorus of EPA Ad-
ministrators claiming that it will take years before we will know
enough to decide whether to control acid rain. I believe we know
enough now to control acid rain."'05 Mitchell's view prevailed in
the committees.
The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee continued
work on the bill by holding hearings in September.0 6 However, the
100. For a discussion of the committee work, see generally Joseph A. Davis,
Wide-Ranging Clean-Air Bill Wins Approval by Senate Panel, 45 CONG. Q. WKX.
1441 (1987); Senate Subcommittee Approves Clean Air Act Reauthorization, Ad-
dresses Acid Rain, Toxics, Auto Emissions, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No.
126, at A-2 (July 2, 1987); Panel Approves Optional Ozone 7Timetable Measure" Sen-
ate Environmental Protection Subcommittee, The Oil Daily, July 2, 1987, at 1; Steve
Marcy, Mitchell Package Would Mandate All Three Ozone Approaches; George
Mitchell Ozone Control Legislation; Gasoline Volatility, The Oil Daily, July 20, 1987,
at 7.
101. Martha Bridegam, Senate Panel Oks Clean-Air Bill Tightening Pollution
Controls, 45 CONG. Q. W.VY. 1734 (1987).
102. Ronald Reagan, Statement on Acid Rain, I PuB. PAPERS 254 (1987).
103. See Ronald Reagan, Address to a Joint Session of Parliament in Ottawa, Can-
ada, I PUB. PAPERS 335-41 (1987).
104. See EPA Chief Says Senate Clean Air Act Renewal Bill is Too Costly, Would
Undermine Role of States, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 140, at A-13 (July
23, 1987) (Lee Thomas testifying that the cost of the program could reach S30 billion
a year); Mary Kate Cranston, States News Service, July 22,1987, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, News File.
105. Cranston, supra note 104. Thomas urged Mitchell not to "overreact because
you're frustrated." Mick Rood, States News Service, July 22, 1987, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File. Several law review commentators, however, had
already focused on the Clean Air Act's inability to deal with acid rain. See, e.g.,
Timothy Stein, Comment, Acid Rain: The Clean Air Act Cannot Handle the Prob-
lem, 56 UMKC L. Rnv. 139 (1987) (noting that economists argued that dealing with
the acid rain was more expensive than trying to prevent it). See also Paul N. Ed-
wards, Through the Crevices: Acid Rain and the Clean Air Act, 11 Omo N.U. L
Rv. 671 (1984); Valerie Lee, Interstate Sulfate Pollution: Proposed Amendments to
the Clean Air Act, 5 HARv. ENvrL L. Rnv. 71 (1981); Carol J. Garland, Note, A
Break in the Acid Rain Clouds, 9 HAmLINE L. Rnv. 613 (1986).
106. For a host of amendments, see Senate Committee Opens Clean Air Act
Markup By Tackling Motorcycles, Bakeries, and Cold Auto Starts, Daily Report for
Executives (BNA) No. 179, at A-4 (Sept. 17, 1987); Diesel Fuel, Offshore Require-
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Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) report in September compli-
cated the Committee's efforts. The CBO concluded that the acid
rain provisions would exact a high cost for the Western and Gulf
Coast states.'"7 Nevertheless, the bill cleared the Environment and
Public Works Committee on October 22, 1987, with a multitude of
acid rain amendments, by a vote of 14-2.101
Work on the bill intensified, but the extensive committee work
ultimately would be in vain. Senators still debated the legislation
close to the end of the session. On November 20, 1987, Senator
Christopher Dodd of Connecticut stated that Congress should fulfill
its collective promise: "The American people are counting on the
100th Congress to protect our health, environment, and economy
from the air pollution plague."' 09 However, on November 17, the
EPA announced that it would relax certain attainment standards
whose deadlines some businesses would fail to meet by the end of
the year." 0 Legislators felt this announcement squelched the moti-
vation to quickly pass a bill."' Although the Senate passed an
amendment to an appropriations bill sponsored by Senator Mitchell
to extend the existing deadlines,"' the package of amendments that
ments Retained in Senate Committee's Clean Air Markup, Daily Report for Execu-
tives (BNA) No. 186, at A-4 (Sept. 28, 1987).
107. CBO Analysis of Senate Acid Rain Bill Projects High Costs for Western and
Gulf States, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 184, at A-3 (Sept. 24, 1987).
108. Senators Steve Symms from Idaho and John Warner from Virginia voted
against the bill. Senate Committee Reports Clean Air Bill, Approves Acid Rain
Amendments, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 204 at A-13 (Oct. 23, 1987).
The amendments were the result of negotiations hammered out between Mitchell
and Senator Simpson of Wyoming, including parsing the twelve million ton reduc-
tion in sulfur dioxide emissions into three phases, eliminating the requirement that
emission reductions at existing locations offset any emissions from new power
plants, and allowing interstate trading of emissions in multistate utility systems. Id.
See also Joseph A. Davis, Major Fights on Clean Air Still Loom, 45 CoNG. Q. WKLY.
2410 (1987); Joseph A. Davis, Senate Panel Completes Work on Overhaul of Clean
Air Act, 45 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2622 (1987). Mitchell prophesied that "none of us
should delude ourselves; a long road remains ahead of us." Lynn W. Garner, Com-
promise Clean Air Legislation Advances Despite Some Opposition, The Oil Daily,
Oct. 27, 1987 at 6 (noting Senator Symms' suggestion to reject the bill because of
high cost for marginal gain).
109. 133 CONG. REc. S16659 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statement by Senator
Dodd in submitting the report of the Committee on Environment and Public
Works).
110. Joseph A. Davis, Hill Critics Go After EPA Plan to Relax Clean-Air Dead-
line, 45 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2866 (1987).
111. Id. See also Senate Air Bill Faces Obstacles as Sponsors Prepare for Floor
Consideration, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 216, at A-8 (Nov. 10, 1987)
(giving as further reasons a jurisdictional dispute among committees, the formation
of a substitute bill, and Majority Leader Byrd's opposition to the acid rain
provisions).
112. S. 1941, introduced by Senator Mitchell and others on December 11, ex-




formed the Clean Air Bill (S. 1894) failed to make it to the Senate
floor before adjournment in 1987.113
The last year in President Reagan's second term, 1988, would
prove equally unfruitful for environmentalists who sought to amend
the Clean Air Act. While the House of Representatives completed
much of its work on the bill, Mitchell attacked cost criticisms on the
Senate side by conceptualizing the Clean Air Act Amendments as a
health bill that would save money in the long term. 4 In early 1988,
tensions increased between Mitchell and Senate Majority Leader
Robert Byrd, who controlled what legislation proceeded to the floor
for consideration.'1 5 In June, Governors Mario Cuomo of New
York and Richard Celeste of Ohio suggested a possible compromise
for the acid rain provisions, calling for a smaller reduction of pollu-
tants as well as provisions for cost-sharing among states.'1 6 In re-
sponse, Mitchell announced that a bipartisan group of twenty-eight
Senators would attempt to amend the measure to provide for cost-
sharing and a lower goal for reductions in sulfur emissions." 7
113. Senate Passes Clean Air Act Deadline Amendmen4 Would Leave in Place
Existing EPA Sanctions, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 239, at A-I (Dec.
15, 1987).
114. USX Corp. Chairman David M. Roderick predicted that the environmental
legislation would result in a 20,000 person job loss in the steel industry alone, and
the Business Roundtable set the cost at $32 to $73 billion a year. John Hartsock,
States News Service, Mar. 9, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
Mitchell responded that "it would be more cost effective to prevent air pollution
rather than to pay for the health problems and other damage caused by air pollution
." Id. Mitchell warned Senators when the bill's defeat for the year was clear.
Senators should recognize that doing nothing is not a cost-free option. It
does not merely delay a solution. It automatically increases the costs of
that solution, both in money eventually spent and in damage sustained.
The direct costs to industry from damage to cash crops is a cost of doing
nothing. The higher costs of technology installed later, on more sources of
pollution, is a cost of doing nothing.
134 CONG. Rnc. S14455-56 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1988).
115. S. 321 was ready for floor consideration in September 1987. Mitchell and
other supporters threatened the use of parliamentary procedure to try to get the bill
to the floor. At this point, Senator Mitchell entered the race for the position of
majority leader. Representative Henry Waxman commented that "those who've
tried to stop any legislation will look at a new majority leader in the Senate ... and
see that this is the year to work out acid rain." Maneuvering Picks Up in Debate on
Clean Air, N.Y. Tmms, May 3, 1988, at 27. The article quotes a Byrd spokesman as
noting that Byrd "has no plans to call up an acid rain bill." Id.
116. See generally Joseph A. Davis, Clean Air-Proposals: No Breakthrough Yet,
46 CONG. Q. WKL..Y. 1631 (1988); Philip Shabecoff, Cuomo and Governor of Ohio
Join in Proposal on Acid Rain, N.Y. TmEs, June 6, 1988, at A-i; DJ. Hill, NY, Ohio
Offer Acid-Rain Compromise, NEWSDAY, June 7, 1988, at 46 (pointing out that New
York has been a major recipient of acid rain and Ohio a major producer); Acid Rain;
Umbrellas Go Up, THE ECONOMIST, June 18, 1988, at 24.
117. Senate Effort on Acid Rain Provisions May Speed Passage of Clean Air Bill,
Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 135 (July 14, 1988); Joseph A. Davis, New
Clean-Air Compromise Put Forth, 46 CONG. Q. WVKY. 1988 (1988).
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Mitchell sought to amend the bill by working with Majority Leader
Robert Byrd, who remained sensitive to his West Virginia constitu-
ents' coal interests.118 By late September, however, the fate of the
Clean Air bill was sealed. 19 The bill died. Clean air legislation
again failed to reach the floor of the Senate. 2
In the final months before Mitchell's election to majority leader,
he expressed his displeasure with the bill's failure:
Some in our society have opposed every major environmental
law ever proposed. Rather than spend $1 to prevent pollution,
they have spent millions of dollars to prevent the passage of
laws to reduce pollution.
Their principal weapon is the exaggerated claim that if any-
thing is required of them to prevent pollution-anything at
all-the cost will be so high that whole industries will have to
shut down, whole states will suffer, whole regions will decline.
A few who say they support the Clean Air Act joined with
many who oppose it. They remained rigid and unyielding,
wholly unwilling to compromise, even when faced with the
certainty that their rigidity would result in no action this year.
In reality, both want to postpone action to the future, when
they hope circumstances will be more favorable to their posi-
tions. I disagree, profoundly.
For, in the meantime, the health of more American children
will suffer, more lakes will die, more forests will wither.
1 21
118. Secrecy Surrounds Negotiations Aimed at Clean-Air Compromise, 46 CoNo.
Q. WKL.Y. 2603 (1988). In fact, Mitchell met with the United Mine Workers in late
September. See Joseph A. Davis, Mitchell Negotiating with UMW: Progress Re-
ported in Efforts to Get Clean-Air Compromise, 46 CoNG. Q. WICLY. 2671 (1988).
119. Joseph A. Davis, Plan Attacked on Several Fronts: Filibuster Threat Dims
Hope for Clean-Air Compromise, 46 CONG. Q. WKLYx. 2722 (1988) (noting that a
variety of groups were against Mitchell's negotiations with Byrd and the high sulfur
coal interests).
120. In the final days of the summer, Byrd continued to refuse to bring the bill to
the floor, proclaiming a desire to bring up other bills in front of Mitchell's bill. Evan
Roth, States News Service, Aug. 18, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News
File. It was suggested in September that Mitchell would attach the bill to any other
bill that was already on the Senate calendar. Evan Roth, States News Service, Sept.
15, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File. Mitchell still maintained
that "I feel more optimistic than I've ever been that we will have a bill this year."
Letta Tayler, States News Service, Sept. 16, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
News File. Mitchell, however, would not support a bill that would not clean the air:
"Too many of the proposals surfacing now are not more than prescriptions for con-
tinuing dirty air.... The Clean Air Act must not be compromised into impotence."
Id. Three weeks later, Mitchell declared the bill dead.
121. 134 CONG. REc. S14457 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1988). Mitchell later clarified this
statement by noting that "I did not intend to criticize any of my colleagues ......
Michael Kranish, Watered-down Bill on Acid Rain Dies Senator Mitchell Blasts N.E.
Colleagues, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 6, 1988, at 1 (correction appended). Kranish
noted that "Iflor Mitchell, the long battle to amend the Clean Air Act of 1977 ended
in what observers called an uncharacteristic public display of frustration." Id. That
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When Mitchell was elected Majority Leader of the United States
Senate on November 29, 1 988,11 his mood shifted from caustic to
hopefully optimistic.12 He immediately acknowledged that this
massive legislative undertaking to protect and ensure clean air could
not be rammed through the Senate without dissent and discus-
sion.' At the same time, President Bush's inauguration ended
President Reagan's effort to repeal or derail environmental laws.
President Bush announced that he would present a plan for clean air
legislation to the Congress early in 1989. Commentators overwhelm-
ingly and immediately realized the increased chances for passage of
clean air legislation in 1989.12
The committee process started out slowly but quickly picked up
intensity. On April 18, 1989, the subcommittee began work on con-
trolling air toxics. The bill called for cutting emissions of more than
two hundred air toxics, a major departure from the 1977 amend-
ments." 6 The EPA would be required to establish standards for
Maximum Achievement Control Technology for these air toxics.12 7
After three years for compliance, the EPA then would review health
risks and penalize industries that could not meet residual risk stan-
dards imposed for these toxics. Smog provisions were formed and
frustration was apparent: "I recognize reality. And the reality is that there will be
no action on clean air legislation this year .... For seven years, I have worked to
enact clean air legislation. For several months, I have tried to work out com-
promises that would be acceptable to the many conflicting political and regional
interests involved." 134 CONG. RIc. S14457 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1988). Indeed, those
conflicting interests stood as a barricade to a compromise on acid rain: "For almost
a decade, the Northeast has been complaining that its lakes are dying because of
acid rain caused by sulfur fumes that spew out of smokestacks of the coal-burning
power generating stations in the Midwest .... It is a highly divisive conflict." Casey
Bukro, Congress' Antipollution Talk Is All Hot Air Again, CIICAGo TimmN, Oct.
30, 1988, at C-4.
122. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
123. In response to a question about his continued work on acid rain, Mitchell
answered, "I hope I can be more effective. I intend to continue to play an active
role in the legislation and in the committee ... I'm going to keep doing the best I
can to get Clean Air legislation enacted ... ." Adam Pertman and Michael Kranish,
Mitchell Shows Combativeness, Caution in Interview, BosroN GLOBE, Dec. 4,1988,
at 20.
124. "[Passage] may not be in a way that achieves universal praise... but I think
it can be done in a way which sufficiently accommodates both concerns .... It's
both a matter of equity and a matter of practicality, but I honestly believe that it can
be done." National Governors Association Annual Midwinter Meeting, Federal
News Service, Feb. 28, 1989.
125. A commentator pointed to Senator Mitchell's election as Majority Leader as
perhaps the "single most important development" in the clean air debate since he
was replacing Byrd, who had protected his state's coal industry. Evan Roth, States
News Service, Dec. 21, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
126. George Hager, Clean-Air Package Part I Toxic Air Pollutants, 47 CONG. Q.
WKLY. 888 (1989).
127. Id. at 889.
19951
MAINE LAW REVIEW
advanced in September." On October 19, 1989, the air toxics sec-
tion of the bill was reported out of the subcommittee by an 11-0
vote.
129
This section of the bill was substantially more strict than the Presi-
dent's proposal,' 3 0 which sent the initial committee work into disar-
ray by introducing a different version of a clean air bill to the
country on June 12, 1989.'11 President Bush's bill included a two-
phase reduction program for the control of acid rain, brought
ninety-three cities into compliance with ozone standards by 2010,
and included a two-phase reduction in toxic air pollutants.13 2 The
bill did not include provisions for protecting the stratospheric ozone
layer; in fact, the bill completely revamped the existing ozone pro-
tection program.' 33 Even though the Environment and Public
Works Committee had not yet completed its own work, Mitchell at-
tacked the President's bill. "The President's words are bold but his
deeds are timid.... Each step forward is matched by a step back-
ward. The Bush bill sends the message that if economics and envi-
ronment are in conflict, economics wins.""' 4 Only three Democratic
senators sponsored Bush's bill.' 35 President Bush shot back at a No-
vember 7, 1989 press conference. He said that Congress was "sitting
back there and carping about it... they sit there and argue back and
forth with each other, and nothing happens."' 36 The clean air de-
128. Christine C. Lawrence, Lines Drawn in Opening Round Over Cleaning Na-
tion's Air, 47 CONG. Q. WK.LY. 2381 (1989).
129. George Hager, Tougher Air-Toxics Standards Get Quick Nod From Panel, 47
CONG. Q. WKLY. 2783 (1989).
130. Id. For instance, the industries would have to meet a cancer-risk standard of
either 1:1,000,000, or, in certain cases 1:10,000, or have to stop operating. Id.
131. RicHARD E. COHEN, WASHINGTON AT WORK: BACK ROOMS AND CLEAN
AIR 60 (1992). Bush noted that five principles were at work in his program: market-
place power, the encouragement of local initiatives, emphasis on prevention instead
of clean up, international cooperation, and strict enforcement of the provisions. Id.;
George Hager, Bush Sets Clean-Air Debate in Motion with New Plan, 47 CONG. Q.
WKLY. 1460 (1989).
132. H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), S. 1490, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989).
133. For criticism of the bill, see The Honorable Henry A. Waxman, An Over-
view of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 1721, 1736 (1991).
134. President's Plan for Clean Air Act Draws More Heat, Chemical Marketing
Reporter, July 31, 1989, at 7. See also Mitchell Says Bush's Clean Air Bill Weak,
Gains Undermined by Offsetting Provisions, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No.
141 (July 25, 1989).
135. Only 3 Democratic Senators Join Bush on Clean-Air Bill, CHiCAGO TRa-
tNE, Aug. 4, 1989, at C2. Donald Riegle Jr. of Michigan, J. James Exon of Ne-
braska, and John Breaux of Louisiana were the only Democratic co-sponsors of the
President's bill. The Administration blamed Senator Mitchell, and he responded
that he had not cajoled any votes. i




bate had become partisan, and the sense that a bill would fail to pass
in 1989 dominated.'37
The Senate responded to the President's criticism. In the last days
of the legislative calendar, the members of the Senate Environment
and Public Works Committee pushed its own bill out of committee
in an effort to avoid a partisan statement. 38 Their action was cou-
pled with Senator Mitchell's promise to make the bill the first floor
consideration of 1990. In fact, the bill was "marked up" (the process
of commenting and amending) in one day so that Mitchell could
bring it to the floor immediately after the recess.'3 9 Even so, the
committee realized that the bill did not represent the entire Senate's
views since different regions of the country were not represented in
the committee in any meaningful way.' 40 One commentator ex-
plained, "[T]he view inside the panel was that it should set the high-
water mark and that it would address complaints from industry
groups and make concessions, as necessary .... "14
This is exactly what happened in the next legislative session. Af-
ter eight years of relative inaction concerning clean air issues, Mitch-
ell invoked his power as majority leader and called up a
comprehensive clean air bill for debate on the floor of the United
States Senate. 42 Introducing the bill on January 23, 1990, he com-
mented that "[i]t is not my intention to force the pace on this bill in
a manner that would deprive any senator of the fullest possible op-
portunities to consider, deliberate on, debate on, ask questions
about, and offer amendments to this bill.' 43 Senator Mitchell con-
137. Christopher Madison, Clean Air Plans Go Up in Smoke, NAT'L J., Nov. 18,
1989, at 2832 (pronouncing the bill "shelved" until next year); George Hager, Clean-
Air Bill Loses Steam in Rush to Adjournment, 47 CONG. Q. \Vu.Y. 3045 (1989).
138. See George Hager, Senate Stage is Finally Set for Clean-Air Showdown, 47
CONG. Q. WicrY. 3145 (1989).
139. CoHEN, supra note 131, at 80. This method engendered criticism. See 'Stall'
Tactic Charged on Clean Air Bill, CimincAL MAm No REP., Jan. 8, 1990, at 3.
Mitchell and Max Baucus of Montana were criticized for rushing the bill through the
committee. Mitchell responded that the committee action was done to comply with
President Bush's requests. Further, a Mitchell spokesperson said that "[tihere will
be significant debate and there should be [sic] Sen. Mitchell welcomes that debate."
Id For criticism of the current committee process, see CoHmN, supra note 131, at 77-
80; Richard E. Cohen, Crumbling Committees, NAT'L J., Aug. 4, 1990, at 1876.
140. New England claimed five committee members, New York and New Jersey
one each; four came from the West, and only one, Senator Warner, was from a coal
state. COHEN, supra note 131, at 77.
141. Id. at 78.
142. Chuck Alston, Key Players: Their Spheres of Influence Go From Heavens to
Earth, 48 CONG. Q. WyLY. 149 (1990). Alston pointed out that a major difference
between the past sessions and this one was that Senator Mitchell had replaced Sena-
tor Byrd as majority leader. Id.
143. COHEN, supra note 131, at 82. Alston pointed out that "there are signs that
Mitchell the majority leader has recognized the need to moderate the views of
Mitchell the senator from Maine ...." Alston, supra note 142, at 149.
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tinued to characterize the bill as being equally important to health
as it was to the environment. Mitchell pointed out that "[i]t is im-
portant that we act not only for ourselves, but for generations to
come, and not only American generations to come. I emphasize
that this is a public health bill.'"1  Mitchell used this conceptual
framework to attack critics of this massive bill. 14 5 Although such a
large bill normally would result in a plethora of amendments on the
floor of either house of the Congress, no Senator offered any
amendments at the beginning of debate.'4 6
On February 1, 1990, after only brief debate on the committee
bill, Majority Leader Mitchell took perhaps the most controversial
and most celebrated legislative action of his tenure. Mitchell with-
drew S. 1630, the committee bill, from the floor and convened
closed door negotiations in his office for the next month. 47 The key
players in the negotiations, in addition to the Senator, were repre-
sentatives from the White House, the other committee members,
and various Senators with individual concerns. Environmentalists
considered the negotiations to be a disgusting example of backroom
144. Press Conference on Clean Air Legislation, Federal News Service, Jan. 22,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File. Mitchell conceptualized on the
global scale: "We are now coming to recognize that the greatest threat to our secur-
ity and the security of people around the world lies not in armed aggression... [but]
in the threat to survival of the human species by the global environmental crisis that
is upon us." Id.
145. When asked if the bill would result in people with families losing their jobs,
Mitchell responded that:
[W]hat [the bill] will mean to the average American family is that they will
be able to breathe healthy air, that their children's lungs will not be dam-
aged or scarred, that they are not as likely to die prematurely as would be
the case if the bill is not passed. ... That's the principal meaning for most
American families.
Id In response to media criticism that the bill would cost too much to implement,
Mitchell asked reporters, "What is the value of your child's health .... What is the
value of your child's life?" George Hager, Cost Becomes the Overriding Issue, 48
CONG. Q. WKLY. 230 (1990).
146. George Hager, Senate Takes Up Clean Air but Doesn't Get Very Far, 48
CONG. Q. WKLY. 229 (1990). In addition, the committee felt that they would not be
able to defeat a filibuster at this point. Cohen hypothesized:
Imagine that you are George Mitchell and you must find a way out of this
deadlock. After working on the subject for nearly a decade, you badly
want a big clean-air bill .... But your Senate committee has produced a
bill that inspires no debate and widespread opposition by senators prepar-
ing to file their amendments. What do you do?
CoHEN, supra note 131, at 83.
147. I had a choice: I could insist on a vote to end the filibuster; a loss
would throw the issue into confusion, a bad loss could result in no bill being
passed at all. Or I could negotiate with the administration, and with indi-
vidual senators who had specific objections to the bill, and try to win over
enough converts to get the necessary sixty votes. I chose to negotiate. The
risk of not doing so was too high.
MrrcHsLL, supra note 3, at 9. See also George Hager, Senate's Clean-Air Struggle
Goes Behind Closed Doors, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. 324 (1990).
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politics." The participants in Mitchell's office responded by pro-
ducing results. 4 ' Tentative deals were made on air toxics, urban
smog, and carbon dioxide emissions." 0 Strengthening the market-
orientated part of the bill's acid rain title was also a compromise
reached by the negotiators.' Negotiations ended after almost a
full month of late night meetings in Senator Mitchell's office.
The negotiators emerged with a compromise.'52 While environ-
mentalists criticized the fact that the modifications resulted in a bill
less strict than the November 1989 committee bill, the sponsors
noted that the bill was in fact much stronger than the administration
bill originally proposed.5 3 At a press conference to announce the
bill, Mitchell concluded that S. 1630 "is sound and comprehensive
legislation that dramatically expands and strengthens the clean air
law and does it in the most cost-efficient manner possible."'5 4 Sena-
tor Dole, an unlikely ally for Mitchell, offered the commitment that
"we'll work together to defeat any amendments which might
weaken those provisions."' 5 Senator Byrd offered both a state-
ment and a concession: "I'm not a signatory. I'm still concerned
about job losses and economic dislocation. But I think the package
that has been brought here ... goes a long way. I'm not going to
engage in any filibuster."'5 6 Notwithstanding the good feelings en-
gendered by the compromise bill, however, several Senators ad-
vanced amendments to both strengthen and weaken the bill.
The architects of the compromise bill now became its ardent de-
fenders against harmful amendments that threatened the delicate
compromise between the Senate and the Bush Administration. In
its first week on the floor, several attempts to amend the bill were
stopped. Nevada Senator Richard H. Bryan withdrew a proposed
amendment that would have strengthened the carbon dioxide provi-
148. Environmentalists felt that their influence was diminished since they had no
voice in the talks. George Hager, Closed-Door Talks on Clean Air Anger Environ-
mental Groups, 48 CONG. Q. WKL. 386 (1990). Mitchell's basic response was that
he had no choice and that the talks were needed to avoid a filibuster. Id
149. See Hager, supra note 147.
150. Id. See also George Hager, Senat White House Near Deal on Modified
Clean-Air Bill, 48 CONG. Q. WNKLY. 584 (1990).
151. See John L Loxterman, The Acid Rain Provisions of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990: Environmental Responsibility or Political Necessity, 10 Ti. n.
Eivn. L & TEcH. J. 201, 208 (1991).
152. 136 CONG. Rc. 82077-86 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1990). The Mitchell/Dole bill
was introduced as S. 1293, 130 CONG. Rrc. 52031 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1990). See also
George Hager, Senate-White House Deal Breaks Clean-Air Logfam, 48 CONG. Q.
WKLY. 652 (1990).
153. Hager, supra note 152, at 654.
154. Senate Radio and TV Gallery Press Conference Regarding the Agreement on
the Clean Air Bill, Federal News Service, Mar. 1, 1990 (statement by Senator Mitch-
ell), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
155. Id. (statement by Senator Dole).
156. Id. (statement by Senator Byrd).
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sions in the Mitchell bill.'5 7 New Jersey Senator Frank R.
Lautenberg tried to strengthen the bill by including more stringent
toxic air pollutant standards for motor vehicles; the Senate tabled
his amendment by a 65-33 vote. 58 Senator Steven Symms from
Idaho offered an amendment calling for community referendums
before plants emitting air toxics could be shut down for health re-
lated reasons. After withdrawing his proposal for lack of votes, he
then tried to amend the bill by prohibiting imports from any nation
without air toxics regulations at least as strong as the United States.
That amendment was tabled by an 81-16 vote.5 9 TWo amendments
that did not violate the Mitchell/White House deal were accepted on
the floor. 1
60
During the week of March 19 the rush to amend the bill intensi-
fied. Senators Tm Wirth of Colorado and Pete Wilson of California
offered an amendment to strengthen the bill by attempting to return
some of the motor-vehicle emissions and smog provisions to the bill
that had been cut in negotiations. The proposal was tabled 52-46.
John Kerry, a Massachusetts Senator, lost a smog amendment when
it was tabled by a 53-46 vote. 161 The fact that amendments to
strengthen the bill were rejected troubled environmentalists, and
Mitchell received much criticism from them for his alleged defection
from their ranks.162 Mitchell increased the stakes of considering so
many amendments by predicting that, if "we do not get a clean-air
bill this year, we are not going to get a clean-air bill in this cen-
tury."'1 63 Mitchell also quickened the process: "I will do everything
within my power to see we do finish it next week .... There will be
157. George Hager, Clean-Air Deal Survives First Senate Assaults, 48 CoNo. Q.
WKu.Y. 738, 739 (1990). Hager notes that "Mitchell persuaded [Senator] Bryan to
withdraw the amendment by promising that the Senate would revisit the issue later
in the year." Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. Rhode Island Senator John Chafee, the Republican floor manager, ar-
gued that passage of this amendment would violate the compromise reached with
the White House in the Mitchell meetings. Id.
160. Tennessee Senator and current Vice President Al Gore amended the bill by
mandating a phase out of HCFCs, alternates to CFCs. Senator John Glenn of Ohio
also amended the bill to omit a provision giving sole regulatory jurisdiction of air
toxics emissions to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Id.
161. See George Hager and Phil Kuntz, Senate-White House Deal Survives An-
other Test, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. 900 (1990).
162. A Congressional Quarterly correspondent noted that "the environment
lobby is dominated by purists, and they have made it clear they do not think much of
the Mitchell-Dole-White House compromise. The Wirth-Wilson amendment was
their main shot at shoring up the bill .... " Phil Kuntz, The 'Super Tuesday' of Clean
Air... Nothing but a Quirky Footnote, 48 CONG. Q. WKCLY. 902, 903 (1990). Cohen
concluded that Mitchell was disappointed that some of his environmental allies in
the Senate were opposing him, but that "he considered his dilemma the price of the
leadership, both in title and in fact, that he was providing." Cohen, supra note 131,
at 96.
163. Hager and Kuntz, supra note 161.
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votes on Monday. There may be all-night sessions, and if we haven't
finished the bill by the weekend, there will be weekend sessions-
Saturday, Sunday, whatever time is necessary."'164
Senator Byrd ultimately represented the last major hurdle for S.
1630 in the Senate. While Byrd agreed not to engage in a filibuster
of the bill, he had not agreed to support the bill either. Now he
advanced an amendment to authorize $500 million to give three
years of job-loss benefits to coal miners losing work as a result of the
Clean Air Act Amendments. For Byrd, this was an expression of his
continued effort to extract some measure of security for the coal
miners he had protected by keeping clean air legislation off the Sen-
ate floor during his tenure as Senate Majority Leader."6 Byrd's
amendment was critical for Mitchell because its passage meant sure
defeat, via a presidential veto, of the acid rain bill Mitchell had
championed since 1981. Mitchell argued that the proposed amend-
ment discriminated "against all workers who are not coal miners. It
provides an inequitable level of benefits based upon that discrimina-
tion. It establishes a new system of compensation that is unique and
without precedent .... "166 On March 29, the Byrd amendment was
narrowly defeated 50-49.167
On April 3 the Senate passed the modified S. 1630 by an 89-11
vote. 68 On the eve of the vote, Mitchell characterized his approach
as centered on compromise even though he had received criticism
from both industry and environmentalists.
We've had 13 years of speeches on the subject. In the
meantime, the air in many American cities has gotten worse,
and the question is do we want to continue to make state-
164. Id.
165. "Byrd's persistent pleas for support and his efforts to show his state's down-
trodden coal miners that he was still their champion was at least as much a plea for
his continued influence in a Senate where he was no longer the formal Democratic
leader." Cohen, supra note 131, at 96.
166. 136 CONG. REc. S3486 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1990) (statement of Senator
Mitchell speaking against the Byrd amendment). Senator Dole added:
We already have benefits in place.... [Tihe bottom line is [that] this is just
not fair. It is inequitable. So we are going to single out some who are
displaced because of pollution control efforts.
What about those workers displaced by other causes like increased com-
petition, shifting tastes, changing economic trends? They do not get these
super benefits. They get the basic benefit, $164 a week average. That is it.
136 CONG. REc. 53484 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1990) (statement of Senator Dole against
the Byrd amendment).
167. See Phil Kuntz and George Hager, Showdown on Clean-Air Bilk Senate Says
'No' to Byrd, 48 CONG. Q. Wr.Y. 983 (1990). Byrd had counted on Senator Biden's
support. When Biden's name was called on the roll, he was ushered into the cloak-
room, where John Sununu, President Bush's Chief of Staff, informed Biden that
passage of the Byrd amendment would result in a Bush veto. Biden voted against
the amendment. CoHEN, supra note 131, at 97.
168. See CoHN, supra note 131, at 98.
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ments, or do we want to make law? And I chose the course of
coming up with a bill and I believe it's the right course and
think we will have a good bill before this year is out.' 6 9
Mitchell also ardently defended himself against the environmental
purists' attacks:
I'm a principal author of the bill that came out of the commit-
tee. I wrote a lot of it, I voted for it. I'm the one who brought
it to the Senate floor and so I know what's in it. That was my
first choice, but we didn't have the votes to pass it.... The
environmental organizations know that.... There is a differ-
ence between the best and strongest bill in the abstract and the
best and strongest bill that can become law. Now I think this
bill that we're going to pass is the best and strongest bill that
can become law and I'm pleased with the result even though it
is not7precisely as I would have done if I were king for a day
Commentators overwhelmingly praised Mitchell for his tireless
work in forging this bill's passage through the Senate.171
The Senate-House conference followed separate passage of the
bill in each house. Senator Mitchell appointed the Senate confer-
ees, 172 and all the conference members were also members of the
Senate Environment Committee. Even though the differences be-
tween the House and Senate bill were not substantial, the confer-
ence proceeded at an exceedingly slow pace, 73 and worry spread
that the conferees could not finish their work before the end of the
legislative session.174 On August 3 the conferees agreed to phase
169. MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 2, 1990) (inter-
view with Senator Mitchell).
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Janet Hook, Big Win for Majority Leader Marks His Rite of Pas-
sage, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1045 (1990); George Hager, Clean Air: War About Over In
Both House and Senate, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1057 (1990); David Broder, Courage
Made the Clean Air Bill a Reality, CHICAGO TRIuBNE, Apr. 11, 1990, at C18 ("[I]t
was George Mitchell who showed that he can make a deal-and make it stick-for
the benefit of millions of Americans .... "); Richard E. Cohen, Leading the Senate
on Clean Air Bill, NAT'L J., Mar. 31, 1990, at 797 (noting that "Mitchell has overseen
almost every detail in the measure."); Gloria Borger, Mitchell Clears the Air, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 9, 1990, at 28 ("With that victory, Mitchell the politician
will vault into the realm of the legislator .... ").
172. Mitchell, Montana Senator Max Baucus, Rhode Island Senator John
Chafee, Minnesota Senator Dave Durenberger, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of
New York, Senator Quentin Burdick of North Dakota, and Wyoming Senator Alan
K. Simpson served as the Senate Conferees. See Clean Air Act Amendments, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3887; COHEN, supra note 131, at 153.
173. George Hager, Cannons of the Conference Room Draw Clean Air Battle
Lines, 48 CONG. Q. WaY. 2291 (1990); see George Hager, Conferees in Holding
Pattern over Clean Air Proposals, 48 CONG. Q. WK.Y. 2399 (1990).
174. Lynn Garner, Passage of Clean Air Act This Year is Uncertain, THE OIL
DALY, Aug. 27, 1990, at B4 (noting that "it will take something of a miracle to get
the job done before the adjournment target date of Oct. 5."). See also Alyson Pytte,
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out ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).'" On September
10 the conferees reached a compromise on urban smog provisions in
the bill.176 One month later they reached agreement on motor vehi-
cle emissions and fuel provisions. 7 7 By October 17 the conferees
had reached agreement on industrial toxic air emissions. 178 The rest
of the conference finished early in the morning of the October 22,
1990, deadline date. Ironically, the final conference bill, agreed
upon early in the morning of October 22 with the Bush Administra-
tion's approval, contained money to aid displaced coal workers. The
Senate approved the conference bill 89-10,1" the House passed it by
a 401-25 vote.180
The final conference bill was environmentally stronger than the
bill passed by the Senate because the deal between the Bush Ad-
ministration and Senator Mitchell extended only to the Senate vote.
The deal did not constrain the conferees. Thus, the House conferees
were free to argue that some of the more stringent provisions should
be reinserted in the conference bill to replace the compromise Sen-
ate provisions.'"" Consequently, the conference's final product was
stronger in several substantive respects than the bill passed in the
Senate.lan
This was a shining moment for Senator Mitchell as the leader of
the Senate, one that defined his method of making law. Armed with
considerable power as the majority leader, he eschewed authorita-
rian control in favor of debate and sought consensus while lending a
guiding hand to push for passage of the legislation. Passing a com-
promise law made more sense to Mitchell than passing no law at all.
Though a staunch Democrat, he sided with the Republican Minority
Leader and a Republican President to protect the bill from poten-
Clean Air Stuck in Conference Over Automobile Provisions, 48 CONG,. Q. WK.Y.
3108 (1990).
175. George Hager, Compromise on CFCs 1st Step in Slow-Moving Conference,
48 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2507 (1990). The Senate agreed to the House provision grant-
ing a two-year moratorium on local and state level design requirements for appli-
ances. They also forged the middle road for a date to phase out methyl chloroform,
setting a 2002 deadline. Id.
176. Alyson Pytte, Conferees Reach Agreement on Urban Smog Provision, 48
CONG. Q. WKLY. 2903 (1990). The Senate accepted the House provisions, which
imposed pollution limitations further into suburbs and rural areas and covered more
industries than the Senate version. Id.
177. Alyson Pytte, Clean Air Conferees Agree on Motor Vedcles, Fuels, 48 CONG.
Q. Wa.y. 3407 (1990).
178. Alyson Pytte, Clean Air Conferees Agree on Industrial Emissions, 48 CONG.
Q. WKLY. 3496 (1990).
179. 135 CONG. REC S17434 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
180. COHEN, supra note 131, at 166.
181. See Waxman, supra note 133, at 1739. Senator Waxman noted that "key
Senators from the Environment and Public Works Committee were free to pursue
the strongest environmental bill possible at Conference." Id.
182. See id. at 1739-42.
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tially deal-breaking amendments that would have altered the com-
promise clean air bill and jeopardized its passage. Mitchell
remained steadfast:
Has compromise now fled the Senate? Are we unable as a
body to reach agreement on legislation that, without dispute,
substantially and dramatically strengthens and improves cur-
rent law? Do we now measure every proposal in the Senate
... [by] some abstract standard of perfection that each senator
is now free to offer on his or her own? That is a prescription
for deadlock.183
B. The Provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
This section presents a brief overview of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments themselves as ultimately enacted. The 1990 Amend-
ments represent a substantial change from previous Clean Air Act
provisions. The original Clean Air Act became law in 1970.11 Sub-
stantive amendments followed in 1977.1' The 1990 amendments186
are grafted onto this structure. They are divided by title into four
substantive subjects: attainment of air quality standards, motor ve-
hicle emission and fuel provisions, toxic air pollutants, and the new
acid rain provisions.
Title I is aimed at meeting National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
dards (NAAQS).'1 These standards are set by the EPA.' 88 States
are primarily responsible for preparing State Implementation Plans
(SIPs) to achieve these standards. 18 9 The EPA then reviews each
SIP.' 90 To enhance these NAAQS provisions, the Clean Air Act
183. Broder, supra note 171.
184. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
185. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
186. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990).
187. For an extensive overview of Title I, see The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
et al., Roadmap to Title I of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Bringing Bhe
Skies Back to America's Cities, 21 ENvTL. L. 1843, 1848 (1991) (concluding that "Ti-
tle I revises almost every aspect of the NAAQS program to reflect insights gained in
twenty years of experience .... ).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1988 & Supp. 1993). The administrator must set attain-
ment and maintenance standards that are "requisite to protect the public health."
Id. For the meaning of this standard see American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665
F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert denied sub nom. American Petroleum Inst. v. Gor-
such, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1)-(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See National Steel Corp.,
Great Lakes Steel Div. v. Gorsuch, 700 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting that the
EPA's role in establishing implementation plans is secondary). Sometimes, how-
ever, the Administrator must step in to promulgate a Federal implementation plan
for a specific state. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
190. Cf Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1989)
(noting that the court had jurisdiction to compel the EPA Administration to take
some formal action in regard to the NAAQS Program).
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Amendments of 1990 enacted new programs to deal with nonattain-
ment of standards regulating ozone, carbon monoxide, and small
particulate matter emissions.191 The ozone provisions call for strin-
gent measures to deal with Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs)
and nitrogen oxide emissions and set various time requirements de-
pending on the severity of the ozone problem in a given area.' 92 A
graduated control program is created for all ozone nonattainment
areas so that areas of more serious classifications are subject to the
more severe control measures. 193 The amendments also set up a
new program establishing interstate ozone transport regions to deal
with regional ozone problems.19 The Clean Air Act Amendments
improved upon existing law by focusing on nitrogen oxide con-
trol. 195 Carbon monoxide levels in "moderate" and "serious" areas
must attain the defined standards by 1996 and 2001, respectively. 96
Finally, small particulate matter nonattainment standards must be
met in "moderate" areas by 1995 and in "serious" nonattainment
areas by 2002, unless the EPA reclassifies areas as needing more
time to reach attainment.197 Such areas may be given five extra
years to reach attainment under certain extreme conditions.' s
Title II regulates car, truck, and general mobile source pollution
by revising the motor vehicle control program. 199 Specifically, con-
ventional vehicles have tighter controls, gasoline and diesel fuel
must be cleaned, cleaner fuel must be promoted, and emission stan-
dards for non-road vehicles must now be instituted.2°0 Stricter
tailpipe standards are set into two tiers for conventional vehicles.20'
Cleaner fuel is promoted by mandating reductions in fuel volatility,
adding cleaning detergents, phasing out leaded gasoline, and the de-
191. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7513(b) (Supp. V 1993).
192. Id. § 7511(a). The Act defines five levels of ozone severity: marginal, mod-
erate, serious, severe, and extreme. Id. For a discussion about what determines cat-
egorization in each classification, see Robert J. Kafin, Revisions Broaden the Impact;
Clean Air Act, NAT'L. L. J., Dec. 24, 1990, at 15.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 7511(a) (Supp. V 1993).
194. Id. § 7511a. Only one interstate ozone transport region is actually created in
the 1990 amendments; it stretches from the Capitol to Maine. 42 U.S.C. § 7511c
(Supp. 1993).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(f) (Supp. V 1993). See also Waxman, supra note 133, at
1761-63; Waxman, supra note 187, at 1885-87.
196. 42 U.S.C. § 7512 (Supp. V 1993).
197. Id. § 7513(b)-(f).
198. Id. § 7513(e).
199. See generally The Honorable Henry A. Waxman et al., Cars, Fuels, and
Clean Air: A Review of Tatle H of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,21 ENVrt-
L. 1947 (1991).
200. See Waxman, supra note 133, at 1769; Waxman, supra note 199, at 1949.
201. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(g) (Supp. V 1993) (setting the Tier I standards). For spe-
cific Tier I standards, see Waxman, supra note 199, at 1957-58. Tier II standards are




sulfurization of diesel fuel."~ Representative Henry Waxman noted
that "a new generation of super-clean vehicles is needed in the most
heavily polluted cities if we are to provide a long term solution to
our smog problems."2"3 Lastly, the amendments command the EPA
to research and implement emissions controls for offi-road vehicles
such as construction equipment and trains.2"
Title III controls hazardous air pollutants."0 5 The provisions that
were passed establish controls for source and area emissions. One
hundred eighty-nine substances are now defined in this title as haz-
ardous air pollutants.20 6 Maximum Achievable Control Technology
is used to reduce emissions from the named substances under this
title.2" After these standards are implemented by the EPA,
residual risks are addressed by directing the Administrator to in-
form Congress about probable risks remaining after Title III is fully
in place.20 The 1990 Amendments seek to control accidental re-
leases of hazardous air pollutants, such as the one in Bhopal, India,
with provision "for prevention, detection, and response to acciden-
tal releases.,2 0 9 The 1990 Title III amendments also provide added
protection in such areas as coastal water,2 10 radionuclides, 211 incin-
erator emissions,212 and coke ovens.21
3
Title IV deals with acid rain and is the centerpiece of the Clean
Air Amendments of 1990. Title IV seeks to "reduce the adverse
effects of acid deposition through reductions in annual emissions of
sulfur dioxide of ten million tons from 1980 emissions levels, and, in
combination with other provisions of this chapter, of nitrogen oxides
emissions of approximately two million tons from 1980 emission
202. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (Supp. V 1993). See Waxman, supra note 199, at 1972-1991
for an extended discussion on the new fuel requirements.
203. Waxman, supra note 133, at 1771. To this end, the amendments set high
standards for emissions. See 42 U.S.C. § 7583 (Supp. V 1993). See also Waxman,
supra note 199, at 1993-2001.
204. 42 U.S.C. § 7547 (Supp. V 1993). See also Waxman, supra note 199, at 2011-
16.
205. For an extensive review of Title IH, see Waxman, supra note 133, at 1772-89.
206. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
207. lt § 7412(d)(2). Waxman, supra note 133, at 1775.
208. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b). The Administrator must do this by 1996. Then the
Administrator must recommend legislation to address the remaining risks. Id.
209. Waxman, supra note 133, at 1783. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (Supp. V 1993).
Under this section, the Administrator must create a list of more than 100 substances
that would cause serious adverse effects to the environment and human health if an
accidental release actually occurred. Id. § 7412(r)(3).
210. I& § 7412(m).
211. Id. § 7412(d)(9). See Waxman, supra note 133, at 1785-86.
212. 42 U.S.C. § 7429 (Supp. V 1993).
213. Id. § 7412(d)(8). See Waxman, supra note 133, at 1788-89.
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levels ... 214 Two programs effectuate this goal. Fst, the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990 depart from the command and con-
trol method of environmental regulation by establishing a market-
based allowance program to reduce sulfur dioxide from utility
sources.2 15 Second, an upper limit is placed on industrial sulfur di-
oxide emissions.216 Nitrogen oxides from stationary sources are
controlled three ways. First, they are controlled in ozone nonattain-
ment areas and transport regions 17 Second, in small particulate
nonattainment areas, nitrogen oxides are controlled as the precursor
to small particulate matter pollution.21 Third, emissions from coal
fired utility plants are controlled. 2 19
The amendments' acid rain provisions have been criticized by
some Senators. In the minority statements of the Senate Report,
Senator Steve Symms summarized the National Acid Precipitation
Association Program reports mandated by the 1980 Act and argued
that Congress should have waited for further findings before acting
since many of the results were speculative.' Senator Byrd contin-
ued to cast doubt on the acid rain provisions: "I am concerned that
... reality may very well diverge from theory, and the cost-saving
and cost-sharing potential of this bold new regulatory approach may
never be realized." '  Finally, commentators are concerned about
the EPA's ability to complete a regulatory scheme for such a mas-
sive law.m2
214. 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (Supp. V 1993). For Congressional findings, see Id. at
§ 7651(a). For an in-depth analysis of this section. see S. Rm,. No. 101-228, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 261-346 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 3385, 3685-3729.
215. For an extensive discussion of the allowance trading program, see Larry B.
Parker et al., Clean Air Act Allowance Trading, 21 ENvT. L 2021 (1991). See also
Norman W. Fichthorn, Command-and-Control vs. The MarkeL: The Potential Effects
of Other Clean Air Act Requirements on Acid Rain Compliance, 21 ENvm. L 2069
(1991).
216. 42 U.S.C. § 7651e (Supp. V 1993).
217. Id. § 7511a(f).
218. Id. § 7513a(e).
219. Id. § 7651(f). For a review of all three of these methods of reducing nitrogen
oxides, see Waxman, supra note 133, at 1797-99.
220. See S. REP. No. 101-228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 415 (1990) (minority views of
Senator Symms), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3796-3866. See also 136
CONG. Rnc. S3245-3248 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1990) (summary of NAPAP reports).
221. U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: An
Innovative, but Uncertain Approach to Acid Rain Control, 93 W. VA. L REv. 477.
488-89 (1991). Byrd reiterated his Senate floor argument:
An equally important issue is that of equity .... It is my contention that
the emissions reduction requirement of the law unfairly require that a dis-
proportionate share of the overall ten million ton reduction in emissions be
achieved by the utility sector and, in particular, by utilities in those states
that have traditionally relied most on the use of high-sulfur coal.
Id. at 491.
222. Warren H. Husband, Comment, New Approaches and New Polluters: The
Practical Impact of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,19 Fi.A. ST. U. L. Rv.
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Three additional titles comprise the balance of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990. Title V expands the permit system for statio-
nary sources by requiring all major sources to get permits from state
agencies.2' Title VI phases out the production of CFCs, halons,
methyl chloroform, and carbon tetrachloride by the year 2002.24 A
second round of substitutes for these chemicals, including
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCS), are phased out on a later
schedule.2' This title also imposes recycling, use, and labeling pro-
visions on both levels of chemical classifications.2 6 Title VII pro-
vides for more stringent penalties for violations. 7 The EPA can
now assess civil fines up to $200,000.22 In addition, some violations
completed with knowledge are now considered felonies.229
IV. MITCHELL AS SENATOR FROM MAINE: THE OIL POLLUTION
AcT OF 1990
A. Passing Oil Liability Legislation
In the midst of clean air proceedings in 1989, the oil tanker Exxon
Valdez ran aground and dumped approximately eleven million gal-
lons of crude oil into Alaska's Prince William Sound.230 The event
galvanized Congress into passing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.231
This section documents the proceedings leading to the passage of
the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990. It explains the conflicts over
international protocols and the possible preemption of state oil lia-
bility and compensation statutes. Those conflicts reveal two impor-
861 (1992) (noting that EPA faces a mammoth task in implementing these
regulations).
223. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a (Supp. V 1993). For an extensive review of Title V, see
Timothy L. Williamson, Fitting Title V into the Clean Air Act: Implementing the New
Operating Permit Program, 21 ENVTL. L. 2085 (1991).
224. 42 U.S.C. § 7671c(b) (Supp. V 1993). For a review of Title VI, see Steven J.
Shimberg, Stratospheric Ozone and Climate Protection: Domestic Legislation and the
International Process, 21 ENVTL. L. 2175 (1991).
225. 42 U.S.C § 7671d (Supp. V 1993).
226. Id. § 7671g.
227. See generally Michael S. Alushin, Enforcement of the Clean Air Act Amend.
ments of 1990, 21 ENvTL. L. 2217 (1991); David T. Buente, Citizen Suits and the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Closing the Enforcement Loop, 21 ENVT. L.
2233 (1991); James Miskiewicz and John S. Rudd, Civil and Criminal Enforcement of
the Clean Air Act After the 1990 Amendments, 9 PACE ENVrL. L. REv. 281 (1992).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
229. Id. § 7413(c)(1).
230. Over a year later the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
noted that from 250,000 to 1.3 million gallons of oil were still in the environment in
Alaska. Casey Bukro, Cleanup Worse Than Oil Spill, Experts Say, CHI. TRm., Sept.
17, 1990, at C1.
231. Within the next few months more spills also occurred in Rhode Island, the
Delaware River, and the Houston Ship Channel. See S. Rep. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d




tant characteristics of Majority Leader Mitchell's developing
stature. First, his resolve in protecting his own state from federal
preemption was unwavering. Second, Mitchell was able to achieve
quick passage of a piece of legislation that had languished in Wash-
ington for fifteen years.
Congress had failed to legislate any comprehensive laws protect-
ing the American coasts from oil spills despite fifteen years of effort.
The critical conflict centered on whether or not the new federal law
would preempt state oil pollution and compensation statutes.
Mitchell's position on this issue was entrenched. He repeatedly
blocked legislation in the Senate because he objected to the elimina-
tion of state oil liability laws?32 His position protected Maine,
which had passed some of the toughest oil pollution laws in the
country.
Mitchell criticized President Bush, however, for executive inac-
tion surrounding the Prince William spill 33 and in April 1989 intro-
duced S. 686.3 41 The bill required the federal government to take
rapid action to clean up oil spills if they were not being handled in a
prompt and effective manner by the responsible companies. Mitch-
ell's bill set up a national fund to pay up to $500 million for damages
and cleanup costs from an oil spill. Finally, Mitchell's bill did not
preempt state oil pollution statutes or compensation funds3 5
During this time the other half of Congress was not sitting silent
on oil pollution. On May 24,1989, the House Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee's Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Navi-
gation passed H.R. 1645 by a 14-9 vote.63 The House bill differed
significantly from Mitchell's measure in that it barred state laws per-
232. See The Honorable George J. Mitchell, Preservation of State and Federal
Authority under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,21 ENvit. L 237 (1991) (arguing that
the adoption of international protocols would harm states by overriding their au-
thority to enact tougher laws). "In the view of some House bill proponents, Mitchell
has almost single-handedly scuttled new oil-spill liability legislation over his insis-
tence that existing state laws, such as Maine's no-limit liability statute, not be pre-
empted by federal law." George Hager, Deadlock Likely to Continue on Oil-Spill
Liability Law, 47 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1183 (1989).
233. "Twelve days ago, the President publicly acknowledged that Exxon's efforts,
standing alone, are not enough to clean up the oil spill .... It is distressing that the
administration took two weeks to come to that conclusion." The Oil Spill in Prince
William Sound, Alaska: Hearing of the Senate Environmental Protection Subcommit-
tee of The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, Apr. 9, 1989 (statement
by Senator Mitchell), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Federal and State News
File. Mitchell argued that the "federal government must ensure that there is a
prompt and effective response to large oil spills .... ." Id. See also Michael Kranish,
In shift, Mitchell Hits Bush on Issues, BOSTON GLOBE, May 19, 1989, at 1.
234. 135 CONG. REc. S3239, 3241 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1989) (statement by Senator
Mitchell).
235. Id.
236. House Panel Votes Oil Spill Liability Bll. Adopts Amendment to Pre-empt
State Laws, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 101 (May 26, 1989).
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taining to damages and removal costs. The House committee
quickly reported their bill out of committee on June 21.237
The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee passed
Mitchell's bill unanimously just before the August recess. The bill
left state laws intact and did not adopt any international protocols
on oil liability. Mitchell did not change his position on preemption:
"I am convinced that this is the right position. The Alaska spill rein-
forces my conviction. No legislation that preempts state laws or
blocks full use of state courts is or will be acceptable to me."'2 38
Howard M. Metzenbaum, a Senator from Ohio, amended the bill on
the Senate floor to double the liability limit.
Knowing Mitchell's stance, members of the House battled among
themselves on the preemption issue. The argument for preemption
was, in part, that unlimited liability was not acceptable. Insurance
costs, some House members argued, would either increase or actu-
ally cause insurance to be unavailable to oil companies. The Senate
disagreed, claiming that "these claims are totally unfounded. Even
in the seventeen states without liability limits, oil shipping and pro-
ducing companies are not refusing to do business." 9 Finally, on
November 8, 1989, the House departed from their precedent by vot-
ing 279-143 not to preempt state laws.24° That same day the House
also voted 213-207 to approve an amendment by California Con-
gressman George Miller, which subjected spillers to unlimited liabil-
ity for simple negligence. In a rare procedural moment the House
reversed itself a day later 197-185 and ultimately defeated that
amendment. The House bill then passed by a 375-5 vote.24 '
The House-Senate conference centered on three central issues.
With the preemption issue resolved, Mitchell moved to stop inclu-
sion of international protocols for liability and compensation of oil
spill victims.1 2 Mitchell argued that federal and state laws offered
more stringent liability standards than the liability standards ap-
237. For a discussion of the House provisions, see The Honorable Walter B.
Jones, Oil Spill Compensation and Liability Legislation: When Good Things Don't
Happen to Good Bills, 19 ENvr.. L. REP. 10333, 10337 (1989) (noting that "it would
be foolish to believe that the bill that passes the House will face smooth sailing in
the Senate"); Robert P. Hey, Congress Tackles Oil-Spill Bill, CHRISTMAN SCInNCE
MONITOR, June 29, 1989, at 7. ("The unknown: Will the Senate and its new majority
leader agree this time to a preemptive bill like the one now steaming through the
House? Five times since 1975 the Senate has refused to approve the idea.").
238. 135 CONG. REc. S9692 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989).
239. See OPA Legislative History, supra note 231, at 728.
240. George Hager, Tough Oil-Spill Measure Rides Atop Environmental Wave, 47
CONG. Q. WKL.Y. 3043 (1989) (concluding that the "House was driven toward a
much tougher oil-spill bill than it had ever passed by widespread fury over the
March 24 spill by the supertanker Exxon Valdez").
241. Id. at 3043-44.
242. For Mitchell's arguments against the international protocols, see generally
Mitchell, supra note 232.
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proved in the international protocols.2"3 The House bill, which in-
cluded the protocols, rested on an assumption that terrible damage
would result from oil spills by foreign vessels. Mitchell argued that
this was merely another version of the preemption issue. Further, it
usurped the Senate's power to ratify treaties.' " After losing a vote
on a proposed amendment in conference, the House conferees
dropped the international protocols from the bill."45
Now, two side issues emerged. On July 12 the conferees agreed to
require all United States tankers to have double hulls by the year
2010, allowing a three-stage phaseout process for single-hulled
ships.2' Finally, Walter Jones, a Congressman from North Caro-
lina, offered a proposed amendment to extend a moratorium on gas
exploration and gas and oil drilling off the North Carolina coast.
That amendment was tacked on to the bill. 47
On August 2 the Senate passed House Resolution 1465, the con-
ference measure, by a 99-0 vote.m A proposed fight over Jones'
amendment never materialized on the House floor, and the bill
passed on August 4 by a 360-0 vote.249 President Bush signed the
bill on August 18, 1994.
B. Provisions of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
The Oil Pollution Act of 199 01s is comprehensive in scope. It
combines several earlier, disparate statutes that existed in a confus-
243. Id. at 243. Using the Exxon Valdez incident as an example, Mitchell noted
that under the protocols, the liability limit would be sixty million dollars unless Ex-
xon acted "recklessly, knowing that an eleven million gallon oil spill and ecological
catastrophe would result." Id. See Phil Kuntz, Oil Spill Liability Negotiators Find
Another Sticking Point, 48 CONG. Q. Wroy. 1261 (1990). Mitchell claimed that
under state laws, "Exxon would have been strictly liable for all cleanup costs and
damages incurred as a result of its spill... estimated at approximately $2 billion."
Id. at 1262.
244. Kuntz, supra note 243, at 1261.
245. Phil Kuntz, Oil-Spill Conferees Break Logjam, 48 CONG. Q. WKLv. 2042
(1990). After passage of the bill, Mitchell noted:
Enactment of the OPA was not a rejection of United States participation in
an international oil pollution regime .... Instead, the action ... was a clear
statement that any international accords must ensure that our full federal
system, which has been preserved and enhanced under the OPA, is not
prevented frorii providing the degree of environmental protection sought
by the American people.
Mitchell, supra note 232, at 251.
246. Phil Kuntz, Oil-Spill Conferees Near End with Deal on Double Hulls, 48
CONG. Q. WKL. 2215 (1990).
247. The amendment is located at 33 U.S.C. § 2753 (Supp. 1992).
248. Phil Kuntz, Oil Pollution Cleanup Bill Is Set for Final Hurdle, 48 CoNG. Q.
WuLy. 2504 (1990).
249. Oil-Spill Bill Cleared, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2590 (1990).
250. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990) (codified
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1992)) (amending the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System Re-
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ing amalgam. In fact, much of it grows out of, and integrates, the
Clean Water Act. Earlier work had been done on oil pollution legis-
lation during the decade; however, that work did not result in con-
crete legislation until this Act passed in 1990. Earlier schemes had
been viewed as incomplete and unable to provide full compensation
for oil spill damages.5
Funds provided by several previous statutes now are collected
under the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. 52 The purpose of the Act
and Fund is "to provide ready and complete compensation for any
party suffering damages from discharges of oil or hazardous sub-
stances." 3 The Fund will be used for immediate cleanup, damage
compensation, and removal, as well as other costs.254 It is intended
to assure "compensation of victims regardless of the liability of the
spiller. ' '21 5 Up to one billion dollars can be used for each incident
implicating the provisions of the Oil Pollution Act.5 6 Further,
under the National Contingency Plan, states are allowed to collect
$250,000 from the Fund immediately after a spill occurs.257 The cost
for these withdrawals from the fund are spread to all oil users by
establishing a five cent-per-barrel tax on all domestic and imported
oil.
2 5 8
The Act establishes the elements of liability for "responsible par-
ties."2 9 Removal costs for a spill can be collected by the govern-
ment, states, or any other party, as long as the collection is
consistent with the OPA's contingency plan.2I The scope of per-
missible recoveries is wide and includes loss of natural resources,
real and personal property damage, loss of subsistence use, lost rev-
enues by the federal or state governments, lost profits, loss or im-
form Act of 1990, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1988), and the Oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund, 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (Supp. 1990)).
251. Michele Straube, Is Full Compensation Possible for the Damages Resulting
from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10338, 10350 (1989) (suggesting
the comprehensive oil spill "legislation has the potential to close loopholes and cor-
rect inconsistencies in current legislation"). See also OPA Legislative History, supra
note 231, at 725.
252. 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (Supp. II 1990).
253. OPA Legislative History, supra note 231, at 731.
254. For a full list, see Id
255. id at 727.
256. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1 1990).
257. 33 U.S.C. § 2712(d)(1) (Supp. I 1990). The President is required to prepare
and publish a National Contingency Plan that will "provide for the efficient, coordi-
nated, and effective action to minimize damage from oil and hazardous substance
discharges ...." Id. § 1321(d)(2).
258. 26 U.S.C. § 4611(c)(2)(B) (Supp. II 1990).
259. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (Supp. II 1990). A "responsible party" includes "any
person owning, operating, or demise chartering the vessel." Id. § 2701(32)(A). The
definition also includes provisions for onshore and offshore facilities, deepwater
ports, pipelines, and any of the above that may be abandoned. Id.
260. Id. § 2702(b)(2).
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pairment of earning capacity, and costs associated with public
services during the clean-up stage."e1
Liability limits were extended considerably. Vessel owners are
subject to liability that is eight times greater than those under the
previous statutory scheme in the Clean Water Act.6 2 If a vessel
exceeds 3000 gross tons, the liability limit for each incident in which
it is involved is $1200 per gross ton, with a cap of $10 million, which-
ever is greater.263 A cap of $2 million exists if the vessel is less than
3000 gross tons.6 Offshore facilities are now subject to the full cost
of cleanup plus added liability to an amount of $75 million. 6 5
The Act's liability limits do not apply in some areas. For instance,
the provisions do not apply in the case of gross negligence, willful
misconduct, or violations of safety regulations.6 Failure to report a
spill can result in a waiver of liability limits.6 Some defenses are
available. No liability exists if the discharge or substantial threat of
discharge was caused solely by an act of God, an act of war, or an
act or omission of a third party.26
Thanks to Mitchell's insistence, the Oil Pollution Act does not
preempt any state oil spill compensation laws.6 9 The Act protects a
state's ability to enact laws stricter than the federal standards.21 0
For instance, in Maine, oil facilities and vessels must be licensed,
and a fund is available to deal with cleanup costs. Maine's law re-
quires that parties to the spill reimburse the money used from the
Fund for the state's cleanup. 7' Congress recognized the vitality of
these funds. The Environment and Public Works Committee report
concluded that "[p]reemption of State funds would make the States
wholly dependent on the Federal funds and response system. The
261. Id. § 2702(b).
262. Id. § 2704(a)(1). Different limits are set depending on the size of the vessel.
For a discussion of the previous liability scheme under the Clean Water Act, see
Straube, supra note 251; Michael . Uda, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Is There a
Bright Future Beyond Valdez?, 10 VA. ENvTL LJ. 403, 405 (1991).
263. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(1) (Supp. II 1990).
264. Id.
265. Id. § 2704(a)(3).
266. Id. §§ 2704(c)(1)(A)-(B). A Senate report noted that "[a] limit on liability is
clearly of benefit to an owner or operator subject to the provisions of this legislation.
Such a benefit should not be conferred, however ... where compliance perhaps
could have prevented or mitigated the effects of an oilspill." OPA Legislative His-
tory, supra note 231, at 735-36.
267. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(2)(A) (Supp. II 1990).
268. Id. §§ 2703(a)(1)-(3).
269. Id. § 2718(a).
270. As of 1990,24 states had oil pollution laws that dealt with cleanup and dam-
ages. OPA Legislative History, supra note 231, at 728. The Committee noted that
they "chose not to impose, arbitrarily, the constraints of the Federal regime on the
States while at the same time preempting their rights to their own laws." Id.
271. Mn. Rlv. ST. ANN. tit. 38 § 552 (1989 & Supp. 1991).
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result might be a decrease in the degree of protection from oil spill
damage, rather than an increase." 2' 7
The Oil Pollution Act also did not adopt any international proto-
cols. 2 73 Although the United States played an active role in devel-
oping two protocols in London in 1984, the Senate did not ratify
them.274 Congress decided that the protocols' standards were too
low to be consistent with the needs of the United States. President
Bush criticized this view,275 and some commentators have agreed
with him.276 One commentator suggests that the United States' fail-
ure to ratify the protocols may result in one set of standards for the
world and another for the United States, which would be governed
by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.277
Finally, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 changed the authority
granted to the President during an oil spill crisis. President Bush
was criticized for the lack of a quick executive response after the
Exxon Valdez spill.278 The Act grants authority to the President to
require private parties to clean up spills.279 Also, the President does
not have to wait to see if the private party will have the capability to
clean up the spill before the federal government intervenes.2 0
V. CONCLUSION
Maine Senator George Mitchell's environmental successes in-
clude the Water Quality Act of 1987, the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990, and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, all complex and
lengthy regulatory enactments. They are the product of varied polit-
ical and legislative strategies. The passage of clean water
reauthorization required votes to overcome two separate vetoes by
the Reagan Administration. The Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 necessitated a level and quality of compromise unmatched in
the previous decade. The passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
marked both the end to a long Congressional squabble over the in-
272. OPA Legislative History, supra note 231, at 728-29.
273. For a thorough discussion of the making of the protocols, see Michael A.
Donaldson, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Reaction and Response, 3 ViLt. ENVTL.
L.J. 283, 301-05 (1992).
274. Id. at 302.
275. George Bush, Statement on Signing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, II Pun.
PAPERS 1144 (1990). "Our failure to ratify the Protocols may weaken long-standing
U.S. Leadership in the development of international maritime standards." Id.
276. Daniel Kopec and H. Philip Peterson, Note, Crude Legislation: Liability and
Compensation under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,23 RuTGERS L.J. 597, 631 (1992)
(arguing that "[t]he problems associated with the lower liability and compensation
limits ... are not insurmountable").
277. Donaldson, supra note 273, at 318 (citations omitted). He also suggested
that the rest of the world might try to emulate this act. Id
278. See supra note 233. See also Uda, supra note 262, at 416.
279. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(e) (Supp. II 1990). See also Uda, supra note 262, at 425.
280. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c) (Supp. TT 1990).
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terrelationship of state and federal law and a quick decisive re-
sponse to a national disaster. These laws each have a profound
effect on the quality of the United States' environment.
Senator Mitchell's efforts were indispensable to the passage of all
three pieces of legislation. When the need was for forceful rhetoric,
Mitchell provided it with the thoughtfulness and deliberateness of a
federal judge. When compromise was needed, Mitchell was the con-
summate politician, whose power of persuasion and sense of fairness
secured votes for all three bills. Mitchell, of course, was not the sole
actor in this drama. He was, however, one of the most involved,
knowledgeable, and respected members of Congress taking part in
the debate to secure adequate environmental protection laws for the
United States.
His approach as majority leader was unlike the approaches of ma-
jority leaders in the past. Upon reaching the pinnacle of power in
the Senate after only eight years as a member, he dispersed that
power to the Senate's members. By encouraging participation and
debate, Mitchell as Majority Leader enacted laws representing true
bipartisan efforts. All three pieces of environmental legislation re-
viewed in this Comment passed by wide margins. All three were
enacted, however, only after lengthy committee work that resulted
in compromises between diverse party, regional, and personal inter-
ests and beliefs. Some of the floor fights were bruising, and Mitchell
sometimes received harsh criticism from those he sought to serve.
These three Acts represent the result of Mitchell's beliefs, his
skill, and his work. Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 has given acid rain the attention that its damage to our envi-
ronment has warranted since the early 1980s. Maine's unlimited lia-
bility law for oil spills remains intact due to Mitchell's passionate
defense of states' rights. The Water Quality Act of 1987 made im-
portant strides to deal with non-point source pollution. Senator
Mitchell has left a worthy legacy.
Michael R. Bosse
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